In an attempt to bring together the research on state capacity, this article proposes a five‐item index to operationalise and measure the concept of state capacity. The index was constructed for 26 post‐communist countries on a yearly basis from their first year of independence from communist rule to 2006. Different states unavoidably display dissimilar levels of aptitude in the different domains of state capacity, but the aggregated index of state capacity presented is high in both validity and reliability. With the help of this index, the starting conditions as well as the evolution of state capacity within the countries included in this study are explored, with three conclusions. First, post‐communist countries emerged displaying very contrasting levels of state capacity. Second, the level of state capacity has remained relatively stable within most countries between 1989–1991 and 2006, which ties in the last conclusion that the initial level of state capacity is the strongest determinant of subsequent levels of state capacity. All three conclusions carry important implications for research using state capacity either as an independent or as a dependent variable.

Although postcommunist countries share a common past, the variability of outcomes in both democracy and economic reform is very large in the region. Only a few countries have become Western-type democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic. By contrast, the norm is clearly not democracy for other Soviet successor states. In this article, the author attributes this variation to differences in the infrastructural capacity of the state. Using both quantitative and qualitative analyses within 26 postcommunist countries, the author argues that for democracy to flourish, the state must first possess the necessary means to maintain law and order and to protect the rights of citizens, in other words, to ensure the maintenance and delivery of essential public goods. The results show that the links between a strong state that has been able to apply a definitive set of rules and democratic institutions are clear.

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In Patterns of Democracy, Arend Lijphart (1999) not only contends that democratic institutions cluster in two distinct forms, but also that consensus democracies-when contrasted with majoritarian arrangements-are "kinder, gentler" types of institutional settings (Lijphart 1999: 301-302). the present article reveals that Lijphart's two dimensional map of democracy, although applicable to established democracies, does not apply equally well to post-communist countries. Nevertheless, multivariate empirical verification reveals that some elements included in the consensus democracy framework should be introduced in new constitutions, but perhaps not as the monolithic cluster of basic laws of constitutions originally suggested by Lijphart. Hence the present study casts a shadow on the relevance of the majoritarian versus consensus classification of democratic regimes. Zusammenfassung:In seinem Buch "Patterns of Democracy" behauptet Arend Lijphart (1999) nicht nur, dass demokratische Institutionen in zwei unterschiedlichen Formen auftreten, sondern auch dass Konsensdemokratie -verglichen mit Mehrheitsdemokratie -einen besseren Typus eines institutionellen Rahmens darstellt. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass Lijpharts zweidimensionale Darstellung von Demokratie nicht auf post-kommunistische Länder übertragen werden kann, obwohl das Konzept auf etablierte Demokratien anwendbar ist. Dennoch verdeutlicht die empirische Überprüfung seines Ansatzes, dass nicht alle, aber durchaus einige Elemente des Konsensdemokratiemodells bei der Gestaltung und Weiterentwicklung neuer Verfassungen berücksichtigt werden sollten. Aus diesem Grund zweifeln die hier vorgestellten Ergebnisse die Relevanz der von Lijphart vorgenommenen Klassifikation für demokratische Regime in postkommunistischen Ländern an.