In this paper, I propose a novel interpretation of the role of the understanding in generating the unity of space and time. On the account I propose, we must distinguish between the unity that belongs to determinate spaces and times which is a result of category-guided synthesis and which is Kant's primary focus in §26 of the B-Deduction, including the famous B160-1nand the unity that belongs to space and time themselves as all-encompassing structures. Non-conceptualist readers of Kant have argued that this latter unity cannot be the product of categorial synthesis. While they are correct that this unity is not the product of any particular act of category-guided synthesis, I argue that conceptualists are right to nevertheless attribute this unity to the understanding. I argue that it is a result of what we can think of as the 'original' synthesis of understanding and sensibility themselvesit is a synthesis, moreover, in which the whole is logically prior to the parts.

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In this paper, I examine the role of attention in Kant’s aesthetic theory in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. While broadly Kantian aestheticians have defended the claim that there is a distinct way that we attend to objects in aesthetic experience, Kant himself is not usually acknowledged as offering an account of aesthetic attention. On the basis of Kant’s more general account of attention in other texts and his remarks on attention in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, I reconstruct Kant’s account of aesthetic attention. On his account, aesthetic attention is simultaneously directed at the form of an object and at the judging subject’s own mental states as she attends to the object. In the experience of beauty, we specifically attend to the harmonious relation between the faculties of imagination and understanding. My aim in this paper is to explore the role that attention plays in Kant’s aesthetic theory.1 The claim that there is a distinct way that we attend to objects when we experience them aesthetically takes centre stage in a number of broadly Kantian aesthetic theories in the twentieth century, in particular, aesthetic attitude theories.2 Consider Jerome Stolnitz’s well-known characterization of the aesthetic attitude as ‘disinterested and sympathetic attention to an object for its own sake’, which he contrasts with the kind of practical attention that characterizes our everyday engagement with objects (Stolnitz, 1960, p. 35). While the emphasis on disinterestedness is clearly inherited from Kant (and from eighteenth-century aesthetics more generally), Kant himself is not usually acknowledged as having an account of aesthetic attention. Nick Zangwill (1992) even suggests that the notion of disinterestedness in aesthetic attitude theories is ‘unKantian’, precisely because it concerns the motivations that drive attention, whereas for Kant, disinterestedness concerns aesthetic pleasure.3 One of the few scholars to highlight the role of attention in Kant’s aesthetics takes it to be continuous with the way we attend to objects in order to conceptualize them, which is thus, even if only implicitly, to deny that Kant endorses a notion of aesthetic attention (Zinkin, 2012).

The harmonious free play of the imagination and understanding is at the heart of Kant’s account of beauty in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, but interpreters have long struggled to determine what Kant means when he claims the faculties are in a state of free play. In this article, I develop an interpretation of the free play of the faculties in terms of the freedom of attention. By appealing to the different way that we attend to objects in aesthetic experience, we can explain how the faculties are free, even when the subject already possesses a concept of the object and is bound to the determinate form of the object in perception.

Through a mixed-methods approach that utilized teacher surveys and a focus group with computer science (CS) instructional coaches, this study examined elementary teachers’ confidence in meeting the needs of students with disabilities, the extent to which the teachers could use the Universal Design for Learning (UDL) framework in CS education, and the strategies that their CS instructional coaches used with them to help meet the needs of all learners, including those with disabilities. Findings from a Wilcoxon signed-rank test and a general linear regression of the teacher surveys revealed that teachers’ confidence in teaching CS and in meeting the needs of students with disabilities increased over the five month coaching study, but their understanding of UDL remained low throughout the study. A qualitative thematic analysis of open-response survey questions revealed that the teachers could identify instructional strategies that support the inclusion of students with disabilities in CS instruction. These strategies aligned with high leverage practices (HLPs) and included modeling, the use of explicit instruction, and opportunities for repeated instruction. When asked to identify UDL approaches, however, they had more difficulty. The focus group with coaches revealed that the coaches’ primary aim related broadly to equity and specifically to access to and the quality of CS instruction. However, although they introduced UDL-based strategies, they struggled to systematically incorporate UDL into coaching activities and did not explicitly label these strategies as part of the UDL framework on a consistent basis. This finding explains, to a large extent, the teachers’ limited understanding of UDL in the context of CS education.