Humans differ greatly in their tendency to discount future events, but the reasons underlying such inter-individual differences remain poorly understood. The evolutionary framework of Life History Theory predicts that the extent to which individuals discount the future should be influenced by socio-ecological factors such as mortality risk, environmental predictability and resource scarcity. However, little empirical work has been conducted to compare the discounting behavior of human groups facing different socio-ecological conditions. In a lab-in-the-field economic experiment, we compared the delay discounting of a sample of Romani people from Southern Spain (Gitanos) with that of their non-Romani neighbors (i.e., the majority Spanish population). The RomaniGitano population constitutes the main ethnic minority in all of Europe today and is characterized by lower socio-economic status (SES), lower life expectancy and poorer health than the majority, along with a historical experience of discrimination and persecution. According to Life History Theory, Gitanos will tend to adopt "faster" life history strategies (e.g., earlier marriage and reproduction) as an adaptation to such ecological conditions and, therefore, should discount the future more heavily than the majority. Our results support this prediction, even after controlling for the individuals' current SES (income and education). Moreover, group-level differences explain a large share of the individual-level differences. Our data suggest that human inter-group discrimination might shape group members' time preferences through its impact on the environmental harshness and unpredictability conditions they face.

We applied the use of thermography to cognitive neuropsychology, particularly as an objective marker of subjective experiences, in the context of lying. We conducted three experiments: (a) An important lie was invented by the participants in 3 min, and it was recounted by phone to a significant person while they were recorded by the thermographic camera, obtaining a face and hands map of the lie. (b) A similar methodology was carried out, but adding the Cold Stress Test (CST) of the dominant hand during the phone call, obtaining a second physiologic marker (the percentage of thermal recovery) to detect the lie. Further, it established a control condition where it generated anxiety in the participants using IAPS images with negative valence and high arousal, which were described by phone to a loved one. We obtained results that showed significant correlations between changes in body temperature and mental set. Of particular interest was the temperature of the nose and hand, which tended to decrease during lying (Experiment 1). The participants also showed a lower recovery of the temperature after the CST when they were lying (Experiment 2). (c) Experiment 3 is a replication of Experiment 2 but with a different type of lie (a more ecological task) in a different scenario (following the ACID interview, with the use of the phone eliminated and participants motivated to lie well). The main pattern of results was replicated. We obtained an accuracy of 85% in detection of deception with 25% of false alarms.

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Humans often “altruistically” punish non-cooperators in one-shot interactions among genetically-unrelated individuals. This poses an evolutionary puzzle because altruistic punishment enforces cooperation norms that benefit the whole group but is costly for the punisher. One key explanation is that punishment follows a social-benefits logic: it is eminently normative and group-functional (drawing on cultural group selection theories). In contrast, mismatch-based deterrence theory argues that punishment serves the individual-level function of deterring mistreatment of oneself and one's allies, hinging upon the evolved human coalitional psychology. We conducted multilateral-cooperation experiments with a sample of Spanish Romani people (Gitanos or Calé) and the non-Gitano majority. The Gitanos represent a unique case study because they rely heavily on close kin-based networks and display a strong ethnic identity. We find that Gitano non-cooperators were not punished by co-ethnics in only-Gitano (ethnically) homogeneous groups but were harshly punished by other Gitanos and by non-Gitanos in ethnically mixed groups. Our findings suggest the existence of culture-specific motives for punishment: Gitanos, especially males, appear to use punishment to protect their ethnic identity, whereas non-Gitanos use punishment to protect a norm of universal cooperation. Only theories that consider normative, group-functional forces underlying punishment behaviour can explain our data.

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