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People as third-party observers, without direct self-interest, may punish norm violators to maintain social norms. However, third-party judgment and the follow-up punishment might be susceptible to the way we frame (i.e., verbally describe) a norm violation. We conducted a behavioral and a neuroimaging experiment to investigate the above phenomenon, which we call “third-party framing effect.” In these experiments, participants observed an anonymous player A decided whether to retain her/his economic benefit while exposing player B to a risk of physical pain (described as “harming others” in one condition and “not helping others” in the other condition), then they had a chance to punish player A at their own cost. Participants were more willing to execute third-party punishment under the harm frame compared to the help frame, manifesting as a framing effect. Self-reported moral outrage toward player A mediated the relationship between empathy toward player B and the framing effect size. Correspondingly, the insula (possibly related to empathy) and cerebellum (possibly related to anger) were activated more strongly under the harm frame than the help frame. Functional connectivity between these regions showed strongest weight when predicting the framing effect size. These findings shed light on the psychological and neural mechanisms of the third-party framing effect.Graphic abstract

Previous studies examining the relationship between ingroup bias and resource scarcity have produced heterogeneous findings, possibly due to their focus on the allocation of positive resources (e.g. money). This study aims to investigate whether ingroup bias would be amplified or eliminated when perceived survival resources for counteracting negative stimuli are scarce. For this purpose, we exposed the participants and another confederate of the experimenters (ingroup/outgroup member) to a potential threat of unpleasant noise. Participants received some ‘relieving resources’ to counteract noise administration, the amount of which may or may not be enough for them and the confederate in different conditions (i.e. abundance vs. scarcity). First, a behavioural experiment demonstrated that intergroup discrimination manifested only in the scarcity condition; in contrast, the participants allocated similar amounts of resource to ingroup and outgroup members in the abundance condition, indicating a context‐dependent allocation strategy. This behavioural pattern was replicated in a follow‐up neuroimaging experiment, which further revealed that when contrasting scarcity with abundance, there was higher activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) as well as stronger functional connectivity of the ACC with the empathy network (including the temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex) for ingroup compared to outgroup members. We suggest that ACC activation reflects the mentalizing process toward ingroup over outgroup members in the scarcity condition. Finally, the ACC activation level significantly predicted the influence of resource scarcity on ingroup bias in hypothetical real‐life situations according to a follow‐up examination.