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and the US-based Prime Group, both sponsored by the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), conducted parallel public opinion surveys on how Chinese view the United States and how Americans view China, respectively. The Chinese study divided the respondents into two groups-the Chinese public and Beijing experts, and the US polls also sent questionnaires to both the US public and Washington experts. This article highlights the findings of Chinese and US surveys, compares the perceptions of individuals in China and the US of each other and bilateral relations, and explores the background of and reasons behind those perceptions.

The intelligent anti-disoperation operation order system is developed. The system is established on operation management system (OMS). OMS provides the underlying technology support for operation order system. The supports of OMS include basic resources such as graphics, device, topology, the integration of real-time data sources, and the interfaces with external systems and so on. The full process management of operation order as well as operation security checking function based on automation system are realized. The system is composed of the relevant servers of OMS, communication server of local dispatch center, dispatcher workstations and other workstations, user workstations of substation, etc. The system is graphics, intelligent application system for dispatcher and supervisor. It is mainly used to many functions such as intelligent operation order generating, multilayered security checking of operating instructions, operation order management in accordance with procedure, offline operation order generating, operation training, etc.

This study examines corporate bond guarantees by developing a theoretical model that decomposes the overall impact of a guarantee into signalling and incentive effects and presenting empirical evidence based on data from China’s corporate bond market. Our empirical research yields considerable evidence for the effects we posit in the model and provides some important insights into the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in China’s bond market. The empirical evidence shows that the bond issuer with lower credit rating are more willing to purchase a bond guarantee and guaranteed bonds have a higher issue spread yield than those non-guaranteed bonds, even though both have the same bond credit rating. Our findings suggest that moral hazard would be better than adverse selection to explain the self- selection of bond guarantees. Prior to bond issuance credit rating signal provides a mechanism to mitigate information inequality, while bond guarantees relieve information asymmetry afterwards.