International student migration/mobility (ISM) has long come under the spotlight in migration and education studies. Previous research has focused primarily on inbound students in Western host countries, with much less attention on sending countries’ policies. Based on evidence from interviews, ethnography, and policy analysis in China, the world’s largest source country of student migrants, I argue that outbound student migration can be integrated into the home country’s broader diaspora politics to serve economic, governmental, and geopolitical policy objectives. These diverse, sometimes-clashing, interests are predicated upon China’s domestic politics and global positioning. To establish a conceptual bridge between ISM and diaspora studies, I depart from the mobility paradigm’s emphases on neoliberalism and de-regulation and, instead, foreground nation-states’ changing, yet-unabating, interests in regulating and strategizing about overseas students. I find that following decades of prioritizing the economic and governmental impacts of student returnees ( haigui, or colloquially “sea turtles”) in boosting the domestic economy and maintaining political stability, China now attaches growing importance to student migrants’ geopolitical value as “grassroots ambassadors” ( minjian dashi) in expanding China’s global influence and enhancing its national image abroad. This geopolitics-focused national reorientation, however, may not be well received by student migrants themselves or fully implemented by street-level migration bureaucrats. By examining tensions between the central Chinese state, student migrants, and frontline local officials, this article sheds new light on ISM as a dynamic policy arena where state ambitions crosscut individual desires and national grand plans are confronted with flexible local improvisation.

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Through a case study of China, one of the largest emigration states and a rising global power, this article probes how a homeland state envisions diaspora politics amid geopolitical transformations. Drawing on historical, policy, and interview data, I argue that China's changing positioning toward Chinese emigrants, triggered by the state's geopolitical vicissitudes, has reshaped and repurposed diaspora institutions. I find that since the 2010s, China's diaspora policies have shifted away from soliciting diasporic support for domestic economic growth and national unification and toward liaising externally with migrants to expand Chinese soft power abroad. In consequence, diaspora institutions with more extensive overseas connections and flexible working experiences have taken precedence over formal state agencies specialized in domestic policymaking. This article makes two theoretical contributions to a multilevel understanding of diaspora politics as traversing simultaneously the domestic and global political fields. First, following neo-pluralism, I examine China's diaspora bureaucracy as composed of a diverse set of state entities with distinctive, or even contradictory, interests, orientations, and philosophies. These organizational variations shape diaspora institutions’ different strengths and fluctuating significance in China's shifting geopolitical strategies. Second, by situating emigrants and diaspora institutions in the macrohistorical framework of world politics, this article pushes research on diaspora politics into more profound dialog with world-systems theory. Rather than assuming an asymmetric interdependence between weaker emigration countries and hegemonic immigration countries, I demonstrate how an aspirational homeland state seeks to challenge this established world order and accomplish its geopolitical ascendancy through diaspora re-strategizing and institutional reshuffling.

The burgeoning field of immobility studies focuses on how migratory aspirations and capabilities shape a given (im)mobility status but devotes scant attention to how people traverse different (im)mobility categories. Through a case study of Chinese students in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic, this article develops two arguments to shed light on migrants’ experiences and strategies in mobility transitions. First, during the pandemic, while China's restrictive travel policies and unfavorable public discourses made return migration extremely difficult, Chinese overseas students also felt unwelcome in the United States, due to visa restrictions and Sinophobic violence. This dilemma of being unable to return to the homeland and being simultaneously stranded in a hostile host society pushed Chinese student migrants, a previously highly mobile population, into immobility. Second, drawing on in-depth interviews, we discover that Chinese overseas students deployed four sets of tools—online crowdsourcing, virtual intermediary, temporal adaptation, and institutional cushioning—to reclaim mobility. We propose the concept of “mobility repertoires” to capture social actors’ active retooling and deliberate restrategizing of digital, cognitive, and institutional resources to navigate unsettling (im)mobility predicaments and construct new mobility tactics. By cross-fertilizing studies of immobility and migration infrastructure, we provide an action-centered, processual account of (im)mobilities as agential practices and robust courses of action, rather than static statuses or categories. This article also transcends the mobility bias in the literature on international student mobility (ISM) by unraveling the co-production of international student immobility by migration policies and discursive constraints in host and home countries.