As an effective way to realize energy savings and environmental protection, cost sharing is gradually becoming an important measure to reduce emissions in the logistics service supply chain under O2O mode in recent years. How to conduct contract selection and design optimization under the cost-sharing situation, and then improve the operational efficiency of the logistics service supply chain is an important issue that needs to be addressed. Firstly, based on the initial market demand for logistics, this paper involves the influence of both online logistics service integrators and onsite functional logistics service providers on logistics market demand in terms of emission reduction and platform brand image and develops a model based on the logistics service demand function in the O2O mode. Secondly, for the role of online and onsite emission reduction services in multi-cycle continuous cooperation to enhance the platform integrator’s brand image, a cost-sharing differential game model between online and onsite services is developed to facilitate providers’ adoption of high-quality emission reduction services. Finally, the HJB equation is used to compare the non-cooperative Nash game, the cost-sharing Stackelberg game, and the cooperative game to make the optimal abatement decision, the optimal benefit, and the cost-sharing ratio of the abatement service supply chain in the non-cooperative Nash game, the cost-sharing Stackelberg game, and the cooperative game. By comparing the results of the three games, we find that the optimal onsite and online abatement service decision is related to the cost, marginal revenue, and the impact of the service on demand; the abatement cost-sharing contract and cooperation are both better than the non-cooperative independent decision state, which can effectively guide the provision of high-quality onsite abatement service and improve the revenue of both parties involved in the logistics service supply chain and the total system’s revenue in the O2O mode. Compared with the cooperative game model, the cost-sharing contract can more effectively facilitate close cooperation between the actors, and the relationship between onsite and online marginal revenue affects the improvement of both parties’ revenue. The findings of the study can provide useful managerial insights for the selection and design optimization of abatement contracts for logistics service supply chains considering cost-sharing via the O2O model.

The resilient strategy of logistics service supply chains with government participation is not only an effective measure for manufacturers and integrators to lower the risks but also an important component of the modern risk management capability of government. From the perspective of risk society, this paper presupposes the existence of emergencies, embeds the “resilient ability” into the logistics service supply chain, establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model among the government, manufacturers, and integrators, and systematically analyzes the strategy selection process under the participation of the government. On this basis, through numerical experiments, this paper examines the supervision sensitivity with different policies on a micro level, investigates the impact incurred by the change in governmental reward and punishment degree, and further complements the research on the complexity of the strategy selection process in reality. The results show that in the short run, regardless of the reward and punishment measure the government chooses, the manufacturers and integrators will choose not to adopt and implement the resilient supply chain strategy, while, in the long run, increasing manufacturers’ initial supervision and implementing relevant reward and punishment measures can guide integrators to choose the strategy. Increasing government integrators’ reward degree and reducing costs can thus promote the enthusiasm of integrators in resilient logistics service supply chains.