In order to increase domestic consumption and thus improve economy, the current regime of China has designed a new urbanization, which is being pursued in two ways: granting urban hukou to rural migrants already in cities and relocating peasants to newly built or sprawled urban areas. In either way, the new urbanization of China faces major obstacles and limits in its implementation stage. For example, local governments, the de facto bearer of the project, seriously lack financial resources; big cities, where a large number of migrants are located, remain far beyond the scope of the hukou reform; the dislocated peasants have not received their full compensation at all; and, migrants or dislocated peasants, they are not guaranteed stable and decent jobs, a most critical source for more domestic consumption. To reach the ultimate goals of the new urbanization, the central government of China should effectively address those issues.

No abstract

Chinese popular nationalism has been spotlighted as a source of the "China Threat" in interpreting the country's foreign policies by China scholars, especially, so-called constructivist pessimists. However, the applicability of this interpretation is quite limited when Sino-South Korea relations are examined.

The “hexie shehui (harmonious society)” is China's new slogan under the Hu Jintao regime, which pursues social and political stability based on sustainable development and people's welfare. However, the country's severe water scarcity and pollution has been a clear fault line in its path to this “harmonious society”. It has threatened people's sustenance; caused grain loss; brought about aquifer depletion and its following land subsidence and seawater penetration; induced water‐seeking migration; and, significantly, triggered conflicts and protests for water. China's political leaders are highly aware of the gravity of the problem and have contrived water‐conservancy programs. However, as the Yellow River Allocation Program, the water consumption quota system/water price increase, and forestation programs demonstrate, the programs have not been implemented effectively due to their institutional flaws as well as the local government's parochialism and corruption.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to describe how China’s approach to a nuclear North Korea has changed and find key variables that explain the changes. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts the traditional qualitative method, referring to different types of reliable and authoritative Chinese and English scholars, books and articles. Findings Although China has accumulated distrust of North Korea and reprimanded the regime for its nuclear program, it has never ignored the strategic value or balance – especially vis-à-vis the USA – the neighboring country provides for it. And for that matter, it has been keen to prevent North Korea from bypassing it and getting closer to the USA. With this strategic calculation in mind, China has mostly made gestures in implementing the UN sanctions against North Korea, though not always. Originality/value This paper proves that China’s strategic calculation has been a constant key variable that explains its approach toward a nuclear North Korea since the inception of the issue in the early 1990s.