The purpose of this article is to analyze why the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum failed. We aim to do that by analyzing the multilevel factors that we argue worked dialectically to block Iraqi Kurds' state-building project. On the Kurdish level, we argue that the Kurdish political and economic spheres are built on partisan bonds and loyalties at the expense of collective and national interest, thus, Iraqi Kurds lack a unified vision, ideology, and central leadership for how to achieve independence. Politically, Kurdish parties disagreed on the timing and the legality of the referendum. Economically, the Kurdish leadership has been unsuccessful in establishing a sustainable political economy able to endure the sanctions imposed on the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) as a reaction to the 2017 referendum. On the regional level, we argue that the Middle Eastern states are prone to ally with the Kurds and build economic and political relations with them as far as the Kurds remain a minority within Iraq. We discuss how Iraq, Turkey, and Iran took immediate and serious measures against the 2017 referendum, thus, shacking the status quo of IKR. Finally, on the international level, we argue that the international community have historically resisted the secession of the Kurds from Iraq. Thus, in 2017 they sustained, yet again, that the territorial integrity of Iraq should be preserved.

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