Composite facial expressions were prepared by aligning the top half of one expression (e.g., anger) with the bottom half of another (e.g., happiness). Experiment 1 shows that participants are slower to identify the expression in either half of these composite images relative to a "noncomposite" control condition in which the 2 halves are misaligned. This parallels the composite effect for facial identity (A. W. Young, D. Hellawell, & D. C. Hay, 1987), and like its identity counterpart, the effect is disrupted by inverting the stimuli (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 shows that no composite effect is found when the top and bottom sections contain different models' faces posing the same expression; this serves to exclude many nonconfigural interpretations of the composite effect (e.g., that composites are more "attention-grabbing" than noncomposites). Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrates that the composite effects for identity and expression operate independently of one another. Bruce and Young's (1986) functional model of face recognition postulates separate parallel routes for the processing of facial identity (who the person is) and facial expression (what they are feeling). Over the years, this dissociation has been investigated by a number of studies using a range of different methodologies. These include cognitive studies of neurologically normal participants (Campbell, Brooks, de

Huntington's disease can particularly affect people's recognition of disgust from facial expressions, and functional neuroimaging research has demonstrated that facial expressions of disgust consistently engage different brain areas (insula and putamen) than other facial expressions. However, it is not known whether these particular brain areas process only facial signals of disgust or disgust signals from multiple modalities. Here we describe evidence, from a patient with insula and putamen damage, for a neural system for recognizing social signals of disgust from multiple modalities.

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