Although financial instruments that, in effect, permit corporations to treat preferred stock dividends as tax-deductible interest have been used by nonfinancial corporations since late 1993, bank holding companies (BHCs) did not issue these trust-preferred securities (TPS) until 1996, when the Federal Reserve qualified them as Tier-1 capital. We delineate and test hypotheses with 1) analyses of the stock-market reaction to the Fed's ruling and to TPS filings and 2) comparisons of BHCs that issued TPS with those that did not. We conclude that regulatory capital requirements, tax savings, and uninsured sources of funds can have significant positive effects on BHCs' demand for capital; growth and investment opportunities have an inconclusive effect; and transaction costs have a negative effect. Our results are not consistent with the moral-hazard hypothesis.

Although financial instruments that, in effect, permit corporations to treat preferred stock dividends as tax-deductible interest have been used by nonfinancial corporations since late 1993, bank holding companies (BHCs) did not issue these trust-preferred securities (TPS) until 1996, when the Federal Reserve qualified them as Tier-1 capital. We delineate and test hypotheses with 1) analyses of the stock-market reaction to the Fed's ruling and to TPS filings and 2) comparisons of BHCs that issued TPS with those that did not. We conclude that regulatory capital requirements, tax savings, and uninsured sources of funds can have significant positive effects on BHCs' demand for capital; growth and investment opportunities have an inconclusive effect; and transaction costs have a negative effect. Our results are not consistent with the moral-hazard hypothesis.

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Although financial instruments that, in effect, permit corporations to treat preferred stock dividends as tax-deductible interest have been used by nonfinancial corporations since late 1993, bank holding companies (BHCs) did not issue these trust-preferred securities (TPS) until 1996, when the Federal Reserve qualified them as Tier-1 capital. We delineate and test hypotheses with 1) analyses of the stock-market reaction to the Fed's ruling and to TPS filings and 2) comparisons of BHCs that issued TPS with those that did not. We conclude that regulatory capital requirements, tax savings, and uninsured sources of funds can have significant positive effects on BHCs' demand for capital; growth and investment opportunities have an inconclusive effect; and transaction costs have a negative effect. Our results are not consistent with the moral-hazard hypothesis.

Unlike a conventional spin-off, a sponsored spin-off takes place when the subsidiary to be divested sells an equity stake to an outside investor before going public, thereby receiving a substantial capital infusion. We find that the stock return performance of a sample of 57 sponsored spin-offs from 1994 through 2005 is significantly negative over a three-year period following the spin-off date. In contrast, 182 conventional spin-offs over same interval record an average return performance. The parent firms' stock performance for the year preceding (following) the spin-off date is below-average (average), suggesting that their earlier performance was adversely affected by the subsidiary and motivated the parent to spin it off. In support of this contention, we find that parent firms tended to under-invest in the subsidiary prior to the spin-off, due to the subsidiary's limited growth opportunities. This under-investment, in turn, could have motivated the subsidiary to seek outside funding sources before going public.