) is a lecturer in the Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Hankuk Univ. of Foreign Studies. He received a Ph.D. in political science from the State Univ. of New York at Buffalo. His research has been empirically exploring the determinants of division and reunification of Korea. Examining quantitatively international relations theories at both Northeast Asian and international levels, he has attempted to build a plausible Korean reunification model. This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2012S1A5B5A07036898).This paper mainly aims to address the question of whether liberal peace is likely in situations of nuclear asymmetry. I assume that a non-nuclear state enters into a trade alliance with a nuclear state to obtain security that the nuclear state is capable of offering. I further assume that a nuclear state enters into trade linkages with a non-nuclear state to obtain trade gains. When nuclear and non-nuclear states engage in disputes, the two states lose security or trade gains. Accordingly, while states in nuclear asymmetry are highly conflict-prone, economic ties in nuclear asymmetry could promote peace by promoting the sharing and exchanging of both economic and security gains. Based on these assumptions, I construct primary hypotheses in a situation of nuclear asymmetry and test these during the period of 1950-2001 under analysis by adopting a logit statistical model. The results support that economic relations in situations of nuclear asymmetry have a significant effect in reducing the likelihood of dyadic disputes, but only when the trading linkages are especially valuable and extensively and mutually dependent. To capture negative evidence, I also construct and examine a rival hypothesis that trade linkages in situations of nuclear symmetry are less likely to lead to reduced conflict. Overall, as expected, the results reveal that economic relations in nuclear symmetry have an insignificant effect on conflict.