Although frequent fluctuations in domestic hog prices seriously affect the stability and robustness of the hog supply chain, hog futures (an effective hedging instrument) have not been listed in China. To better understand hog futures market hedging, it is important to study the steady state of intersubjective bidding. This paper uses evolutionary game theory to construct a game model between hedgers and speculators in the hog futures market, and replicator dynamic equations are then used to obtain the steady state between the two trading entities. The results show that the steady state is one in which hedgers adopt a “buy” strategy and speculators adopt a “do not speculate” strategy, but this type of extreme steady state is not easily realized. Thus, to explore the rational proportion of hedgers and speculators in the evolutionary stabilization strategy, bidding processes were simulated using weekly average hog prices from 2006 to 2015, such that the conditions under which hedgers and speculators achieve a steady state could be analyzed. This task was performed to achieve the stability critical point, and we show that only when the value of λ is satisfied and the conditions of hog futures price changes and futures price are satisfied can hedgers and speculators achieve a rational proportion and a stable hog futures market. This market can thus provide a valuable reference for the development of the Chinese hog futures market and the formulation and guidance of relevant departmental policies.

There are a series of problems in China, such as low farmers’ income, difficulty in financing for farmers, and relatively lag in rural financial reform. The mortgage financing of farmland management rights is one of the important ways to solve these thorny problems and promote economic development. From the perspective of farmers, combined with empirical analysis, this paper fully considers farmers’ ideas, carries out risk identification and risk assessment for the mortgage loan of farmland management rights, and continuously improves the relevant risk prevention mechanism to reduce the operation risk of farmers’ farmland mortgage. This paper expounds the establishment principles of the risk evaluation index system in detail, lays a theoretical foundation for the selection of indicators, determines the risk evaluation system of land management right mortgage financing from the perspective of farmers, and builds a fuzzy-level comprehensive evaluation model. Based on the practical research data, the fuzzy hierarchy (F-AHP) comprehensive evaluation method is used to conduct an empirical comprehensive evaluation on the risk of the mortgage loan of the farmland management right and analyze the evaluation results. Among the surveyed farmers in the survey area, 242 have not actually participated in the mortgage loan of farmland management rights, accounting for 94.16% of the sample farmers. However, there are only 15 farmers who actually use the farmland management right for mortgage financing, accounting for 5.84% of the sample.

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