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File pollution (i.e. , sharing of corrupted files, or contaminating index information with bogus index records) is a de facto problem in many file sharing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems in use today. Since pollution squanders network resources and frustrates users with unprofitable downloads (due to corrupted files) and unproductive download trials (due to bogus index records), the viability of P2P systems (and similar distributed information-sharing applications) is questionable unless properly addressed. Thus, developing effective anti-pollution mechanisms is an immediate problem in this literature. This paper provides useful information and deep insight with future researchers who want to design an effective anti-pollution mechanism throughout an extensive measurement study of user behavior and file pollution in a representative DHT-based P2P system, the Kad network.

Different from the traditional client-server model, it is possible for participants in a cooperative distributed system to get quality services regardless of the number of participants in the system since they voluntarily pool or share their resources in order to achieve their common goal. However, some selfish participants try to avoid providing their resources while still enjoying the benefits offered by the system, which is termed free-riding. The results of free-riding in cooperative distributed systems lead to system collapse because the system capacity (per participant) decreases as the number of free-riders increases, widely known as the tragedy of commons. As a consequence, designing an efficient incentive mechanism to prevent free-riding is mandatory for a successful cooperative distributed system. Because of the importance of incentive mechanisms in cooperative distributed system, a myriad of incentives mechanisms have been proposed without a standard for performance evaluation. This paper draws general incentive design considerations which can be used as performance metrics through an extensive survey on this literature, providing future researchers with guidelines for the effective incentive design in cooperative distributed systems.

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