The selection of fresh product suppliers is a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) problem with great significant and application value. This requires trade-offs between multiple criteria to prove its ambiguity and uncertainty. Therefore, a novel two-stage fuzzy integrated MCDM method to select suitable suppliers is employed. In the first stage, two collective relationship matrixes are constructed by quality function development (QFD), and relationships among customer requirements (CRs), company strategies (CSs) as well as selection criteria are considered separately in the two matrixes. Subjective criteria weights are obtained by fuzzy best-worst method (BWM) appropriately. In the second stage, the objective criteria weights are obtained using Shannon's entropy method, and the fuzzy multi-objective optimization by ratio analysis plus the full multiplicative form (MULTIMOORA) is applied to rank suppliers. Finally, an application case is applied to prove the feasibility of the proposed method. These conclusions can help companies improve their CSs and increase their market competitiveness.

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Given consumers' willingness to pay different prices for new energy vehicles (NEVs) and traditional vehicles, we construct a utility model of ordinary and green consumers. We establish pricing game models for centralized and decentralized decisions in an NEV's supply chain in order to study the impact of changes in consumers' low carbon preference heterogeneity on supply chain pricing and member profit. The results show that consumers' low carbon preferences and the ratio of green consumers increases with the ex-factory and selling prices of NEVs. An increase in the percentage of green consumers under centralized decision-making will reduce the total profit of the supply chain. Manufacturers' profits under decentralized decision-making are greater than the dealers' profits, and the sum of the two members' profits under decentralized decision-making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision-making. We design a revenue-sharing contract to eliminate the double marginal effect.

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