We discuss network neutrality regulation of the Internet in the context of a two-sided market model. Platforms sell broadband Internet access services to residential consumers and may set fees to content and application providers on the Internet. When access is monopolized, cross-group externalities (network effects) can give a rationale for network neutrality regulation (requiring zero fees to content providers): there exist parameter ranges for which network neutrality regulation increases the total surplus compared to the fully private optimum at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on content providers. However, for other parameter values, network neutrality regulation can decrease total surplus. Extending the model to a duopoly of residential broadband ISPs, we again find parameter values such that network neutrality regulation increases total surplus suggesting that network neutrality regulation could be warranted even when some competition is present.

In 2009 Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum started publishing a new series of Working Papers. These are available for download on www.entreprenorskapsforum.se, and are part of our ambition to make quality research available to a wider audience, not only within the academic world. Scholars from different disciplines are invited to publish academic work with the common denominator that the work has policy relevance within the field of entrepreneurship, innovation and SMEs. The working papers published in this series have all been discussed at academic seminars at the research institution of the author. ABOUT SWEDISH ENTREPRENEURSHIP FORUMSwedish Entrepreneurship Forum is the leading Swedish network organization for generating and transferring policy relevant research in the field of entrepreneurship and small enterprise development. Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum is a network organization with the aim• to serve as a bridge between the small business research community and all agents active in development of new and small enterprises. • to initiate and disseminate research relevant to policy in the fields of entrepreneurship, innovation and SME.• to offer entrepreneurship researchers a forum for idea sharing, to build national and international networks in the field and to bridge the gap between research and practical application.Find out more on www.entreprenorskapsforum.se

We discuss network neutrality regulation of the Internet in the context of a two-sided market model. Platforms sell broadband Internet access services to residential consumers and may set fees to content and application providers on the Internet. When access is monopolized, cross-group externalities (network effects) can give a rationale for network neutrality regulation (requiring zero fees to content providers): there exist parameter ranges for which network neutrality regulation increases the total surplus compared to the fully private optimum at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on content providers. However, for other parameter values, network neutrality regulation can decrease total surplus. Extending the model to a duopoly of residential broadband ISPs, we again find parameter values such that network neutrality regulation increases total surplus suggesting that network neutrality regulation could be warranted even when some competition is present.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may ABSTRACTAlthough private equity firms are often criticized for layoffs, little evidence exists regarding which employees lose their jobs and why. We argue that explanations for the job polarization process can also explain layoffs after buyouts. Buyouts reduce agency problems, which triggers automation, offshoring, and tougher bargaining with labor unions. We show that workers in less productive firms who perform routine or offshorable job tasks are more likely to lose their jobs. The opposite trend holds for workers who perform non-routine or non-offshorable job tasks. Moreover, workers who belong to aggressive labor unions are more likely to lose their jobs.

The authors cast entrepreneurship as one of three career choices—remaining with one’s employer, changing employers, or engaging in entrepreneurship—and theorize how the likelihood of entrepreneurship evolves over one’s career. They empirically demonstrate an inverted U-shaped relationship between accumulated experience and entrepreneurship across various industries and jobs. The authors highlight the difficulty of inferring the mechanism underlying the observed relationship, despite detailed career history data and job displacement shocks that eliminate the current employer choice. These analyses motivate a formal career transitions model in which employer-specific and general skills accumulate with experience but potential employers observe only total skill. Results from the model presented here are that entrepreneurial career transitions vary with two relative costs: 1) the cost to an individual to form a business and 2) the cost to a potential employer to utilize the individual’s employer-specific skills. The authors discuss how this model contributes new insights into an entrepreneurial career.