The existing form of social exchange theory has serious flaws. Yet, this article argues that exchange theory should and can be a powerful tool for analysis at both the micro and macro levels. A model of exchange is developed that: (1) includes temporality; (2) includes both positive and negative sanctions; (3) defines rationality and voluntariness in such a way as to account for long-term, stable systems of unequal exchange; and (4) links the micro and macro levels of analysis. Selective historical materials are introduced to analyze the problem of routine, peaceful, unequal exchange between Romans and barbarians inside the Roman Empire. In interpersonal exchange, it shows, all the terms of exchange are not negotiated by the partners to exchange. Governing rules have been established by collective actors at the macro level for social exchange at the micro level. Traditional exchange theory has failed to identify the historically distant conflict of macro level actors over governing rules.Exchange theory as developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s has languished. What is wrong with exchange theory? Most immediately apparent is its failure to cope with unequal exchange.' In the 1970s there were attempts to incorporate power and equity into the framework of exchange analysis. Building on economists' analysis of market behavior at the micro level but adding assumptions regarding power and equity, this research demonstrated the way interpersonal commitment modifies gain-seeking behavior in face-to-face exchange networks (Cook and Emerson 1978).During the same decade, however, macro level analysis of world power and dependency relations raised questions about coercion. Coercion, it was emphasized, was not a rare event. It could nor be excluded from analysis by definition or proclamation. Violence could not be defined away as simply expressive behavior, irrelevant to the negotiation of exchange. All the terms of exchange were nor negotiated by individuals face-toface at the moment of exchange. It became clear that the quiet and apparently unconstrained character of many exchanges might be a consequence of the time frame *Direct all correspondence to:

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