Peace negotiations have traditionally aimed at reaching a negotiated settlement between political representatives in conflict settings. However, these settlements have seldom been rejected in referendums. This article uncovers whether the way peace negotiations are conducted influences peace settlement referendum outcomes in order to determine if and how they can better foster public support for peace settlements. It analyses and compares if and how specific characteristics of the Annan Plan and the Good Friday Agreement negotiations influenced the rejection of the former in 2004, and the acceptance of the latter in 1998, in their respective referendums in Cyprus and Northern Ireland. Through the qualitative analysis of elite interviews and documental data, it demonstrates that political inclusivity, civil society engagement and the public exposure of the negotiations shaped the opposing outcomes of the two cases, as well as differences in the support given by the local communities. It argues that peace settlement referendums require less secretive and more inclusive negotiation processes, which can better foster political support and civic mobilisation, and inform and engage the wider communities at earlier stages of the peace process.

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Peace referendums can be exploited by political actors who may gain politically from opposing a peace process. This article explores how political opposition affects peace negotiations, particularly when a referendum is used to ratify an agreement, through the study of the Colombian peace negotiations between the government of President Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). It finds that the exclusive character of the negotiations, coupled with their confidentiality, contributed to the political opposition’s capacity to influence public opinion against the peace process and to reject the peace agreement in the 2016 referendum. This qualitative study is based on the content analysis of reports, memoirs and interviews with key negotiation delegates, journalists and representatives of the referendum campaigns. It argues that political inclusion in peace negotiations can help prevent referendum spoiling, while public information and education during the negotiations can reduce the impact of disinformation and manipulation campaigns.

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