The aim of the article is to identify a degree of inclusive growth and to examine the influence of determinants of inclusive growth in the European Union (EU-27) countries, with particular emphasis on factors related to the influence of governments and central banks. The study took advantage of the weight correlation method, which was used to build an inclusive growth measure for the EU-27 for the years 2000, 2008, and 2020. For the construction of the inclusive growth rate, 42 factors were selected that affect inclusive growth in the economic, financial, and non-wage area. These determinants are found in the area of the influence of economic authorities, and mainly in the area of authorities responsible for conducting monetary and fiscal policy and general governance. On the basis of the built-up indicator of inclusive growth, it was noticed that among the 27 EU countries in the studied three years, only four countries distinguished themselves with the highest inclusive growth over the last 21 years, these are: Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Finland. On the other hand, invariably, three countries recorded the lowest inclusive growth, i.e., Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania. The added value of the structure of the inclusive growth indicator was a possibility to observe which of the three areas: economic, financial, or non-wage, had a significant impact on the position of a given country in the compiled inclusive growth ranking.

The importance of the central bank and the government conducting their policies has increased recently, with more attention being given to the effectiveness of policy mix. The non-cooperative models of the monetary and fiscal game are frequently employed to study interactions between both authorities. The models assume that the authorities take into account each other's choices when making decisions. It is also important to remember when seeking equilibrium in the non-cooperative models that in the Nash Equilibrium (which is sought in this study) the parties try to come up with the best response to the opponent's decision. The aim of the paper is to present the Nash Equilibrium in a non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank using a non-cooperative model of a fiscal-monetary game (a policy-mix MODEL). This study demonstrates that in the Nash Equilibrium in the model, the budget deficit and interest rate of an EU member state depend on the exogenous data (external to the model), such as inflation target, base inflation and the Maastricht deficit limit. This study is enhanced by an analysis of the government and central bank's sensitivity to the deep parameters of economic variables.

The study presents the impact of monetary-fiscal policy mix on economic growth, mainly for the investments of euro area in financial crisis. Fiscal policy and monetary policy play an important role in the economy, influencing each other and on a number of economic variables as well. In the face of the recent financial crisis, which turned into a debt crisis, fiscal and monetary authorities have been working together to revive economic activity. There was a significant economic impact on the level of government investments. The central bank kept interest rates at very low levels and used nonstandard instruments of monetary policy. Fiscal authorities have increased government spending to stimulate investment and economic recovery. The paper concludes that the management of the fiscal and monetary authorities in a crisis situation has been modified compared to the period before the crisis, when the coordination of these policies was clearly weaker.

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