This paper reports an empirical study that investigated associations between the quality of care received by older people in residential settings and features of the care homes in which they live. Data were gathered from the first announced inspection reports (2002-2003) of all 258 care homes for older people in one county of England (Surrey). The number of inspected standards failed in each home was used as the main indicator of quality of care. Independent variables (for each home) were: size, type, specialist registration, on-site nursing, ownership, year registered, location, maximum fee, vacancies, resident dependency, whether the home took publicly funded residents, care staff qualifications and managerial quality. Quality of care was modelled using a Poisson count maximum likelihood method based on 245 (91%) of the inspected homes for which relevant data were available. The results showed that quality of care (as defined by failures on national standards) was statistically associated with features of care homes and their residents. A higher probability of failing a standard was significantly associated with being a home that: was a for-profit small business (adjusted risk ratio (RR) = 1.17); was registered before 2000 (adj. RR = 1.22), accommodated publicly funded residents (adj. RR = 1.12); was registered to provide nursing care (adj. RR = 1.12). Fewer failures were associated with homes that were corporate for-profit (adj. RR = 0.82); held a specialist registration (adj. RR = 0.91); charged higher maximum fees (adj. RR = 0.98 per 100 pound sterling unit). A secondary analysis revealed a stronger model: higher scores on managerial standards correlated with fewer failures on other standards (r = 0.65, P < 0.001). The results of this study may help inform future policy. They are discussed in the context of alternative approaches to measuring quality of residential care, and in terms of their generalisability.

A time-inconsistency problem in regulation often results in under-investment especially where there are high sunk costs in network industries such as electricity, gas, telecommunications and water. This paper provides a new perspective on this 'hold-up' problem facing the price regulation of a firm with market power where full commitment to a price regime is not possible. We compare a political equilibrium based on a voting model with lobbying with a delegation equilibrium, where a government can delegate to a particular 'type' of pro-or anti-industry regulator. Our analysis suggests two possible ways in which we may observe price regulation that encourages socially optimal investment in the absence of externally imposed regulatory commitment: first, there is less than total transparency in which voters receive an optimal amount of information and second, the decisions on price are delegated to a sufficiently, but not excessively, pro-industry regulator.JEL Classification: L51

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Haematology patients can have a good experience when undergoing blood transfusion at a day hospice. Hospices should perhaps offer this procedure more widely.

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