In the Internet of Things (IoT), physical objects are able to provide or require determined services. The purpose of this work is to identify malicious behavior of nodes and prevent possible On-Off attacks to a multiservice IoT. The proposed trust management model uses direct information generated from direct communication with the nodes to evaluate trust between nodes. This distributed approach allows nodes to be completely autonomous in making decisions about the behavior of other nodes. We perform network simulations using Contiki-OS to analyze the performance of the proposed trust model. Simulation results show effectiveness against On-Off attacks and also a good performance to recognize malicious nodes in the network.

Layered internet of things (IoT) architectures have been proposed over the last years as they facilitate understanding the roles of different networking, hardware, and software components of smart applications. These are inherently distributed, spanning from devices installed in the field up to a cloud datacenter and further to a user smartphone, passing by intermediary stages at different levels of fog computing infrastructure. However, IoT architectures provide almost no hints on where components should be deployed. IoT Software Platforms derived from the layered architectures are expected to adapt to scenarios with different characteristics, requirements, and constraints from stakeholders and applications. In such a complex environment, a one-size-fits-all approach does not adapt well to varying demands and may hinder the adoption of IoT Smart Applications. In this paper, we propose a 5-layer IoT Architecture and a 5-stage IoT Computing Continuum, as well as provide insights on the mapping of software components of the former into physical locations of the latter. Also, we conduct a performance analysis study with six configurations where components are deployed into different stages. Our results show that different deployment configurations of layered components into staged locations generate bottlenecks that affect system performance and scalability. Based on that, policies for static deployment and dynamic migration of layered components into staged locations can be identified.

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The growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) led to the deployment of many applications that use wireless networks, like smart cities and smart agriculture. Low Power Wide Area Networks (LPWANs) meet many requirements of IoT, such as energy efficiency, low cost, large coverage area, and large-scale deployment. Long Range Wide Area Network (LoRaWAN) networks are one of the most studied and implemented LPWAN technologies, due to the facility to build private networks with an open standard. Typical LoRaWAN networks are single-hop in a star topology, composed of end-devices that transmit data directly to gateways. Recently, several studies proposed multihop LoRaWAN networks, thus forming wireless mesh networks. This article provides a review of the state-of-the-art multihop proposals for LoRaWAN. In addition, we carried out a comparative analysis and classification, considering technical characteristics, intermediate devices function, and network topologies. This paper also discusses open issues and future directions to realize the full potential of multihop networking. We hope to encourage other researchers to work on improving the performance of LoRaWAN mesh networks, with more theoretical and simulation analysis, as well as practical deployments.

Since a genome is a discrete sequence, the elements of which belong to a set of four letters, the question as to whether or not there is an error-correcting code underlying DNA sequences is unavoidable. The most common approach to answering this question is to propose a methodology to verify the existence of such a code. However, none of the methodologies proposed so far, although quite clever, has achieved that goal. In a recent work, we showed that DNA sequences can be identified as codewords in a class of cyclic error-correcting codes known as Hamming codes. In this paper, we show that a complete intron-exon gene, and even a plasmid genome, can be identified as a Hamming code codeword as well. Although this does not constitute a definitive proof that there is an error-correcting code underlying DNA sequences, it is the first evidence in this direction.