BackgroundTo investigate whether Swedish physicians, contrary to Swedish health care policy, employ considerations of patient responsibility for illness when rationing expensive treatments.MethodsA random sample of oncologists and pulmonologists made up the main study-group (n = 296). A random sample of GPs (n = 289) and participants from the general population (n = 513) was used as contrast group. The participants randomly received one version of a questionnaire containing a case description of a terminally ill lung cancer patient. The two versions differed in only one aspect: in one version the patient was a smoker and in the other a non-smoker. The main questions were whether to offer a novel, expensive and marginally life-prolonging treatment and whether the patient could be held responsible for her illness. The quantitative data was analysed using Chi2-tests and comments were analysed using content analysis.ResultsAmong oncologists and pulmonologists, 78% (95% CI: 72-85) would offer the treatment to the non-smoker and 66% (95% CI: 58-74) to the smoker (Chi-2 = 5.4, df = 1, p = 0.019). Among the GPs, 69% (95% CI: 61-76) would treat the non-smoker and 56% (95% CI: 48-64) the smoker (Chi-1 = 4.9, df = 1 and p = 0.026). Among the general population the corresponding proportions were 84% (95% CI: 79-88) and 69% (95% CI: 63-74).ConclusionThis study indicates that applying an experimental design allowed us to go beyond the official norms and to show that, compared to a smoking patient, both the general population and physicians are more inclined to treat a non-smoking patient. This clearly runs counter to the official Swedish health care norms. It also seems to run counter to the fact that among the physicians studied, there was no association between finding the patient responsible for her disease and the inclination to treat her. We think these paradoxical findings merit further studies.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12910-015-0019-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

BackgroundThe aim of this study was to investigate whether physicians who felt strongly for or against a treatment, in this case a moderately life prolonging non-curative cancer treatment, differed in their estimation of medical indication for this treatment as compared to physicians who had no such sentiment. A further aim was to investigate how the notion of medical indication was conceptualised.MethodsA random sample of GPs, oncologists and pulmonologists (n = 646) comprised the study group. Respondents were randomised to receive either version of a case presentation; in one version, the patient had smoked and in the other version she had never smoked. The physicians were labelled value-neutral (65%) and value-influenced (35%) on the basis of their attitude towards the treatment.ResultsIn the ‘value-influenced’ group, there was a significant difference in the estimation of medical indication for treatment depending upon whether the patient had smoked (50% (95% CI: 41–59) or never smoked (67% (95% CI: 58–76) (Chi-2 = 5.8, df = 1; p = 0.016)). There was no such difference in the ‘value-neutral’ group.ConclusionThis study shows that compared to value-neutral physicians, value-influenced physicians are more likely to base decisions of medical indication on medically irrelevant factors (in this case: the patient’s smoking status). Moreover, medical indication is used in an ambiguous manner. Hence, we recommend that the usage of ‘medical indication’ be disciplined.

BackgroundSwedish healthcare providers are supposed to be value-neutral when making clinical decisions. Recent conducted studies among Swedish physicians have indicated that the proportion of those whose personal values influence decision-making (the value-influenced) vary depending on the framing and the nature of the issue.ObjectiveTo examine whether the proportions of value-influenced and value-neutral participants vary depending on the extent to which the intervention is considered controversial.MethodsTo discriminate between value-neutral and value-influenced healthcare providers, we have used the same methods in six vignette based studies including 10 more or less controversial interventions. To be controversial was understood as being an intervention where conscientious objections in healthcare have been proposed or an intervention that is against law and regulations.ResultsEnd of life decisions and female reproduction issues are associated with conscientious objection and more or less against regulations, and also resulted in the highest proportions of value-influenced participants. Following routines, which is not in conflict with official values, were associated with one of the lowest proportion of value-influenced participants. The difference between the highest and lowest proportions of value-influenced participants among the 10 examined interventions was significant (81.8% (95% confidence interval: 78.1–85.5) versus 34.7% (95% confidence interval: 29.2–40.2)).ConclusionThe study indicates that the proportions of value-neutral participants decrease the more controversial an issue is, and vice versa. In some cases, however, framing effects may potentiate or obscure this association. As a bold hypothesis, we suggest the proportion of value-neutral or value-influenced might indicate how controversial an issue is.

Luck egalitarianism, a theory of distributive justice, holds that inequalities which arise due to individuals’ imprudent choices must not, as a matter of justice, be neutralized. This article deals with the possible application of luck egalitarianism to the area of health care. It seeks to investigate whether the ethos of luck egalitarianism can be operationalized to the point of informing health care policy without straying from its own ideals. In the transition from theory to practise, luck egalitarianism encounters several difficulties. We argue that the charge of moral arbitrariness can, at least in part, be countered by our provided definition of “imprudent actions” in the health area. We discuss the choice for luck egalitarianism in health care between ex ante and ex post policy approaches, and show how both approaches are flawed by luck egalitarianism’s own standards. We also examine the problem of threshold setting when luck egalitarianism is set to practise in health care. We argue that wherever policy thresholds are set, luck egalitarianism in health care risks pampering the imprudent, abandoning the prudent or, at worst, both. Furthermore, we claim that moves to mitigate these risks in turn diminish the normative importance of the ethos of luck egalitarianism to policy. All in all, our conclusion is that luck egalitarianism cannot be consistently applied as a convincing and relevant normative principle in health care policy.