Salafism is a branch of Sunni Islam whose modern-day adherents claim to emulate “the pious predecessors” (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ; often equated with the first three generations of Muslims) as closely and in as many spheres of life as possible. Different scholars of Islam throughout time have striven to emulate the early Muslim generations in the legal sphere, in theological matters, or in both. The ideas espoused by these scholars have more or less culminated in the Wahhabi movement that started on the Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century, which in turn helped spread a Salafi message to the rest of the Arab and Muslim worlds and even beyond. As such, the trend now referred to as Salafism came about, expressing itself ideologically in teachings that are meant to present the trend as exclusively and meticulously adhering to the example of the salaf, while rejecting all other sources of influence. Practically, Salafism can be divided into three branches: quietist Salafism, whose adherents shun political activism and concentrate on “cleansing” and teaching Islam in all its “purity”; political Salafism, which does concentrate on political commitment as an integral part of Islam through contentious debates, parliamentary participation, and founding political parties; and Jihadi-Salafism, whose followers seek to overthrow supposedly apostate regimes in the Muslim world through violent jihad. Although the term “Salafism” is heavily contested among Salafis—with adherents of one branch often not allowing the application of the label to be applied to the other branches—its various ideas and manifestations show that Salafism is quite a diverse phenomenon.

AbstractThe concept ofal-walāʾwa-l-barāʾ (loyalty to Islam, Muslims, and God and disavowal of everything else) has developed in various ways in Wahhabi discourse since the 19th century. This can partly be ascribed to the civil war that caused the collapse of the second Saudi state (1824–91) and the lessons that both quietist and radical Wahhabi scholars have drawn from that episode. In this article, I contend that Wahhabi contestations ofal-walāʾwa-l-barāʾ can be divided into two distinct trends—one social and the other political—and that both show the enduring legacy of the second Saudi state, which can still be discerned in Wahhabi scholarly writings on the subject ofal-walāʾwa-l-barāʾ today.

Salafis do not view Shias very favourably. In general, this has to do with their ideological objections to Shias' beliefs and, perhaps secondarily, the political conflicts with Shia powers like Iran, Syria and the Lebanese Hizballah (Haykel, 2010;Steinberg, 2009). Given the fact that Jordan has virtually no Shias, the kingdom may differ from other countries in that the sectarian issue is less urgent there. Yet Jordanian Salafis also use sectarianism to vilify other Sunnis in a competition for their own regime's favour.This article shows that Jordanian Salafis contribute to the sectarianization of the kingdom with their own anti-Shiism by relying on a discourse in which anti-Shia ideological and political arguments and intra-Sunni polemics are inextricably mixed. It first deals with the Jordanian regime's stance on Shias and its relationship with Salafis. The article then analyses what some prominent Jordanian Salafi scholars have said about Shias and how they have used this to curry favour with the regime, at the expense of other Sunnis. The Jordanian contextThe regime's view of Shias Views of Shias in Jordan were strongly influenced by the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Yet negative perceptions of Shias held by King Husayn (r. 1953-1999), who ruled Jordan at the time, seem to have emanated more from his opposition to the new Iranian regime than from anti-Shia feelings. In order to keep out Iranian influence, Jordan began promoting a 'moderate ' and 'official' Islam (Robbins & Rubin, 2013). This was the reason several Islamic institutes were founded, including the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, established in 1980. This institute aims to bring together all Muslimsincluding Shiasand has also been used to counter the discourse of militant groups like al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State (IS) with a 'moderate' message, a campaign that especially King 'Abdallah II (r. 1999-) has been in the forefront of (Minzili, 2007).

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This article focuses on how and why some Jordanian Muslim Brothers have engaged in relatively exclusive, Islamist ways of confronting the regime during the “Arab Spring,” while others adopted a more inclusive, national strategy in the same period. As such, this article not only contributes to our knowledge of divisions within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, but also shows how this can impact Islamist-regime relations in the Arab world. It argues that the organization as a whole initially wanted to exploit the uprisings in the region through a relatively exclusive, Islamist approach to the regime, but that others within the organization disagreed with this method as the “Arab Spring” proved mostly unsuccessful. Aware of the dangers of provoking the state from a position of increased isolation, these members advocated a more inclusive attitude toward the regime and others. While both groups were ultimately unsuccessful, the latter at least survived as a legal entity, while the Muslim Brotherhood lost its official presence in the kingdom because the regime was able to exploit the existing divisions within the organization.