No abstract

In February 2019, The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) and the British Veterinary Association (BVA) published a joint open letter to the British Government calling for a repeal of a legal exemption that permits the slaughter of animals without prior stunning. The RSPCA and BVA argue that repealing the exemption is required on grounds of animal welfare, claiming that non-stun slaughter causes unnecessary pain and suffering. By contrast, Islamic and Jewish groups assert that non-stun slaughter, when properly conducted, is both humane and a religious requirement for least some followers of their faiths. This article considers whether imposing a ban on non-stun slaughter is compatible with obligations to protect religious freedom and non-discrimination under the European Convention of Human Rights. It will conclude that it can be and, when done to protect animal welfare, falls within Contracting States’ margin of appreciation.

This article argues that, while socioeconomic rights have the potential to contribute to the contestation of austerity measures and the reimagining of a "postneoliberal" order, there are a number of features of socioeconomic rights as currently constructed under international law that limit these possibilities. We identify these limitations as falling into two categories: "contingent" and "structural." Contingent limitations are shortcomings in the current constitution of socioeconomic rights law that undermine its effectiveness for challenging austerity measures. By contrast, the structural limitations of socioeconomic rights law are those that pertain to the more basic presuppositions and axioms that provide the foundations for legal rights discourse. We address these limitations and conclude by arguing that it is possible to harness the strengths of socioeconomic rights discourse while mitigating its shortcomings. A key element in moving beyond these shortcomings is the development of an understanding of such rights as just one component in a portfolio of counterhegemonic discourses that can be mobilized to challenge neoliberalism and austerity.

This article draws upon a Neo-Gramscian analysis of World Order to critically assess the relationship between neo-liberal globalisation and socioeconomic rights. It argues that, notwithstanding the well-documented discursive tensions that appear to exist between neo-liberalism and socioeconomic rights, the latter have been re-conceptualised in a manner that is congruent with the hegemonic framework of the former in a number of international institutional settings. This has been achieved in part through three discursive framing devises which I term socioeconomic rights as aspirations, socioeconomic rights as compensation and socioeconomic rights as market outcomes. I conclude by arguing that, despite such appropriation, there are still fruitful possibilities for counter-hegemonic articulations of socioeconomic rights to contest neo-liberal globalisation.

This article argues that criminal liability for offences against animals under UK law should be extended to include offences of killing, even if the death caused is painless and does not interfere with property rights or biodiversity. I defend this position by appealing to two norms that have significant purchase in the UK legal context: (1) the value of protecting animal welfare and (2) the harm principle as a basis for criminalisation. It will be argued that killing itself is a welfare issue, as it deprives sentient beings of future good experiences and can reduce their lifetime wellbeing to levels lower than it otherwise would have been. Joel Feinberg's normative work on criminalisation is drawn upon to argue that the harm principle, properly conceived, restricts liberty to protect both humans and other sentient animals from harm, including the harm of death in some instances. Potential objections to this claim are considered and rejected.