The paper aims at making explicit and question the dominant conception that morality is a matter of values and valuation. This conception is usually taken as the self-evident frame of analysis, both in ethical theorizing and in everyday life and also in most discussions of ethics in medical contexts (e.g. in debates about 'values-based practice'). We argue that the dominant conception is deeply flawed insofar as it implies a repression of the fundamental importance of I-you relationships. As a consequence of this repression, what are commonly taken to be 'personal' and even 'individualist' moral outlooks are, in fact, merely the reverse side of collective norms and values, just as 'particularism' in ethics is not a real alternative to 'universalism', but rather both are variations on the same repressive theme. In showing this, we also outline the sense in which the moral relationship between an 'I' and a 'you' has an altogether different 'grammar' or sense.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's so-called Big Typescript from the early 1930s includes a famous chapter on ‘Philosophy’. This article examines how Wittgenstein saw the character of the philosophical problems he was dealing with, in particular the connection between them, language trouble, and the broadly speaking moral-existential difficulties apparently referred to in the opening statement. It is crucial to realise that reflection on the possible intertwining of philosophical problems and moral difficulties will not only challenge standard conceptions of philosophy, but also of morality. Wittgenstein always stresses the ‘depth’ of philosophical problems. Through his patient work of reflection and questioning of philosophical preconceptions and prejudices, he reveals how difficult it is, not just to free oneself from their grip but to realise that one is in their grip.

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This is a response to Stephen Buetow's comments on our paper 'Collectivity, evil and the dynamics of moral value'.

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