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Historically, solar photovoltaic (PV) generation has been able to claim a significant 'premium' in revenues over other generation types because of its correlation in operation with peak demand (and therefore high priced) periods. However, similar to many international markets, recent conditions in the Australian National Electricity Market, including low demand, high levels of rooftop PV generation and oversupply of capacity, are found to have eliminated the revenue premium for solar. Half-hourly modelling to 2030 illustrates that historical premiums are unlikely to resurface. Storage is shown to increase solar revenues at high penetrations, but can have a detrimental effect on solar revenues at lower solar penetration levels. Therefore at high solar penetration levels, solar generators will be incentivised to develop storage assets, since they can capture additional portfolio market benefits by minimising the decline in solar premiums because of the merit order effect. In contrast, most other market participants will find storage detrimental to revenues because of increasing competition during high priced periods, and will therefore have less incentive to include storage in their portfolios.

In theory, well designed electricity markets should deliver an efficient mix of technologies at leastcost. But energy market theories and energy market modelling are based upon equilibrium analysis and in practice electricity markets can be off-equilibrium for extended periods. Near-term spot and forward contract prices can and do fall well below, or substantially exceed, relevant entry cost benchmarks and associated long run equilibrium prices. However, given sufficient time higher prices, on average or during certain periods, create incentives for new entrant plant which in turn has the effect of capping longer-dated average spot price expectations at the estimated cost of the relevant new entrant technologies. In this article, we trace generalised new entrant benchmarks and their relationship to spot price outcomes in Australia's National Electricity Market over the 20-year period to 2018; from coal, to gas and more recently to variable renewables plus firming, notionally provided by-or shadow priced at-the carrying cost of an Open Cycle Gas Turbine. This latest entry benchmark relies implicitly, but critically, on the gains from exchange in organised spot markets, using existing spare capacity. As aging coal plant exit, gains from exchange may gradually diminish with 'notional firming' increasingly and necessarily being met by physical firming. At this point, the benchmark must once again move to a new technology set. Cambridge Working Papers in Economics Faculty of Economics www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk On entry cost dynamics in Australia's National Electricity Market EPRG Working Paper 1841 Cambridge Working Paper in Economics 1875

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Australian climate change policy and its integration with Australia's electricity markets have been fraught for at least two decades. The only enduring policy has been the Commonwealth Renewable Energy Target (RET). Despite the relative success of the RET in driving investment and reducing emissions, state governments have now pivoted towards contracts-for-difference (Cfds). In this article, we outline the issues associated with policy discontinuity and the large-scale RET and review its effectiveness as an emissions reduction tool and driver of electricity sector abatement. We find that the RET has been relatively successful across the key criteria of cost and emissions reductions and is a better policy instrument than contracts-for-difference, which are increasingly being adopted by state governments. Building on the work of Nelson et al. ( 2020), we propose a new approach, which would allow for continued use of Cfds but utilising the RET's policy architecture.