United Nations peacekeeping is implemented by a complex bureaucratic organization, which itself can be a source of dysfunction and failure. This article empirically explores the strategies officials within the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations apply in order to continue to do their job as effectively as possible despite the limitations of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. The findings demonstrate that internal acknowledgement and relevance of work are core strategic goals of UN officials. However, as the actual practices of achieving these objectives vary at different levels and locations of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, these strategies contribute to a significant diversity of local and decentralized decision-making frameworks rather than a rationalized effective bureaucracy.

International interventions in post-war countries aim to support national governments in rebuilding vital state functions. They de facto become strong political players, but form self-referential systems parallel to national politics, neither checked nor balanced by the population of the respective host country. This relationship is explored in the case of Liberia, where we analyse different forms of resistance and their resonance for the international intervention. Our findings indicate that intervening actors in Liberia largely fail to respond to constructive forms of resistance. However, destructive forms of resistance such as violence and obstruction provoke strong attention. This creates an environment that is not conducive to an inclusive and stable democracy.

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