In this paper we adopt Sterelny's (2010) framework of the scaffolded mind, and its related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity (and not just cognition) is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the "extended-mind" view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines (sociology, ethnography, developmental psychology), and develop phenomenological considerations to distinguish different ways in which we experience the world in affectivity. Sterelny's Scaffolded MindSterelny (2010) distinguishes various dimensions of what he calls the scaffolded mind. This term refers to the idea that the mind is "environmentally supported," more specifically that 2 cognitive agents engineer their environment to sustain as well as amplify their cognitive abilities. Sterelny in particular draws on the niche-construction model (Odling-Smee et al., 2003) to characterize the scaffolded mind. According to this model, organisms carve out environmental niches to which they then adapt; in this way, processes of manipulation of the environment feed back onto the manipulating organism and transform it, often increasing the organism's chances of survival. A classic example of niche construction is the dam-building activity of the beaver, which changes the environment where the beaver lives, which in turn affects the beaver's behavior and that of its progeny.Niche construction comes in different varieties (Sterelny, 2003, chapter 8). For example, organisms physically modify their habitat, constructing structures (e.g. shelters, nests, dams) that modify how the environment impacts on them. Social organization is also a form of niche construction, for it creates a certain set of conditions that change the selective landscape. What Sterelny (2010) calls the scaffolded mind refers to processes of epistemic niche construction characteristic of human agency, consisting primarily in making cognitive tools and assembling informational resources to scaffold intelligent action: written language, mathematical notations, calendars, watches, telescopes, computers, etc. Moreover, in the human case, environmental scaffolding exerts its influence across generations in a particularly profound way, via the transmission of ecological and technical expertise (what Sterenly calls "intergenerational social learning"; see also Sterelny, 2012).Sterelny introduces the scaffolded-mind view as an alternative to the extended-mind view (ExM henceforth), first formulated by Clark & Chalmers (1998) and further elaborated by Andy Clark and others (e.g., Clark, 2008;Menary, 2010b). According to ExM, sometimes the material vehicles that realize the mind encompass not just neural or even bodily activity, but also that of the material environment. Sterelny does not reject ExM, b...

I defend a model of the musically extended mind. I consider how acts of “musicking” grant access to novel emotional experiences otherwise inaccessible. First, I discuss the idea of “musical affordances” and specify both what musical affordances are and how they invite different forms of entrainment. Next, I argue that musical affordances – via soliciting different forms of entrainment – enhance the functionality of various endogenous, emotion-granting regulative processes, drawing novel experiences out of us with an expanded complexity and phenomenal character. I argue that music therefore ought to be thought of as part of the vehicle needed to realize these emotional experiences. I appeal to different sources of empirical work to develop this idea.

No abstract

This paper is an exploration of how we do things with music-that is, the way that we use music as an "esthetic technology" to enact micro-practices of emotion regulation, communicative expression, identity construction, and interpersonal coordination that drive core aspects of our emotional and social existence. The main thesis is: from birth, music is directly perceived as an affordance-laden structure. Music, I argue, affords a sonic world, an exploratory space or "nested acoustic environment" that further affords possibilities for, among other things, (1) emotion regulation and (2) social coordination. When we do things with music, we are engaged in the work of creating and cultivating the self, as well as creating and cultivating a shared world that we inhabit with others. I develop this thesis by first introducing the notion of a "musical affordance". Next, I look at how "emotional affordances" in music are exploited to construct and regulate emotions. I summon empirical research on neonate music therapy to argue that this is something we emerge from the womb knowing how to do. I then look at "social affordances" in music, arguing that joint attention to social affordances in music alters how music is both perceived and appropriated by joint attenders within social listening contexts. In support, I describe the experience of listening to and engaging with music in a live concert setting. Thinking of music as an affordance-laden structure thus reaffirms the crucial role that music plays in constructing and regulating emotional and social experiences in everyday life.

Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain‐ and body‐bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended emotions thesis (ExE). In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy, psychology, and the cognitive sciences. First, we outline the background of the debate and discuss different argumentative strategies for ExE. In particular, we distinguish ExE from cognate but more moderate claims about the embodied and situated nature of cognition and emotion (Section 1). We then dwell upon two dimensions of ExE: emotions extended by material culture and by the social factors (Section 2). We conclude by defending ExE against some objections (Section 3) and point to desiderata for future research (Section 4).