This book asks what distinguishes peaceful plural democracies from violent ones and what distinguishes violent ethnic groups from peaceful ones within the same democracy. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it suggests that ethnic groups and their political demands are not inherently intransigent and that violence is not a necessary corollary of ethnic politics. The book posits that ethnic identity serves as a stable but flexible information shortcut for political choices, influencing party formation and development in new and maturing democracies. It furthermore argues that political intransigence and violence expressed by some ethnic groups stem from circumstances exogenous to ethnic affiliations. In particular, absolute restrictions on ethnic access to the executive produce conditions under which ethnic group incentive to participate in peaceful electoral politics is eliminated. A number of case studies and statistical analysis of all electoral democracies since 1945 are used to test and support the formal argument.

Funding of parties is common and controversial in new democracies. Nonetheless, the nascent literature about the effects of money in new party systems largely sidesteps the issue of public funding. This article seeks to begin filling this theoretical and empirical void. Two hypotheses are formulated about the expected effects of introduction and marginal increases in public funding on institutionalization of the party system. The hypotheses are then tested in a statistical study of all new democracies in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and other former Soviet Republics. The results show strong support for the idea that public funding increases institutionalization of new party systems. This is in stark contrast to theories about more established democracies that hold introduction of public funding decreases institutionalization of the party system. Furthermore, the results suggest that differing thresholds to public funding have divergent effects on political institutionalization, but this effect is not necessarily linear.

Protracted conflicts over the status and demands of ethnic and religious groups have caused more instability and loss of human life than any other type of local, regional, and international conflict since the end of World War II. Yet we still have accumulated little in the way of accepted knowledge about the ethnic landscape of the world. In part this is due to empirical reliance on the limited data in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project, whose selection biases are well known. In this article we tackle the construction of a list of ‘socially relevant’ ethnic groups meeting newly justified criteria in a dataset we call AMAR (A for All). We find that one of the principal difficulties in constructing the list is determining the appropriate level of aggregation for groups. To address this issue, we enumerate subgroups of the commonly recognized groups meeting our criteria so that scholars can use the subgroup list as one reference in the construction of the list of ethnic groups most appropriate for their study. Our conclusion outlines future work on the data using this expanded dataset on ethnic groups.

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