Abstract:! Scientists differ in the ways they approach their work. Some are happy to follow in the footsteps of others, and continue with work that has proven fruitful in the past. Others like to explore novel approaches. It is tempting to think that herein lies an epistemic division of labor conducive to overall scientific progress: The latter, explorer-type scientists, point the way to fruitful areas of research, and the former, extractor-type scientists, more fully explore those areas. And indeed, it has now long been acknowledged that the social structure of science can

This paper defends revealed preference theory against a pervasive line of criticism, according to which revealed preference methodology relies on appealing to some mental states, in particular an agent’s beliefs, rendering the project incoherent or unmotivated. I argue that all that is established by these arguments is that revealed preference theorists must accept a limited mentalism in their account of the options an agent should be modelled as choosing between. This is consistent both with an essentially behavioural interpretation of preference and with standard revealed preference methodology. And it does not undermine the core motivations of revealed preference theory.

This paper argues that Lara Buchak's risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory fails to offer a true alternative to expected utility theory. Under commonly held assumptions about dynamic choice and the framing of decision problems, rational agents are guided by their attitudes to temporally extended courses of action. If so, REU theory makes approximately the same recommendations as expected utility theory. Being more permissive about dynamic choice or framing, however, undermines the theory's claim to capturing a steady choice disposition in the face of risk. I argue this poses a challenge to alternatives to expected utility theory more generally.

Most papers in theoretical economics contain thought experiments. They take the form of more informal bits of reasoning that precede the presentation of the formal, mathematical models these papers are known for. These thought experiments differ from the formal models in various ways. In particular, they do not invoke the same idealized assumptions about the rationality, knowledge and preferences of agents. The presence of thought experiments in papers that present formal models, and the fact that they differ from the formal models in this way are often ignored in debates on what, if anything, we can learn from formal models in theoretical economics. I show that paying due attention to thought experiments in theoretical economics has serious implications for this debate. Differences between thought experiments and formal models are especially problematic for Sugden's 'credible worlds' account.

Risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory is motivated by small-world problems like the Allais paradox, but it is a grand-world theory by nature. And, at the grand-world level, its ability to handle the Allais paradox is dubious. The REU model described in Risk and Rationality turns out to be risk-seeking rather than risk-averse on one natural way of formulating the Allais gambles in the grand-world context. This result illustrates a general problem with the case for REU theory, we argue. There is a tension between the small-world thinking marshaled against standard expected utility theory, and the grand-world thinking inherent to the risk-weighted alternative.Keywords Decision theory Á Risk Á Expected utility Á Risk-weighted expected utility Á Allais paradox Buchak's Risk and Rationality opens with four examples where the risk-averse choice seems rational, despite violating expected utility theory. These alluring choices appear compatible with Buchak's risk-weighted expected utility theory, however, making it an attractive alternative view of rational choice.Here we challenge whether REU theory really does accommodate these examples. We will focus on the most famous of the four, the Allais paradox. Our argument is that REU theory struggles to handle this paradox on the theory's own 123Philos Stud (2017) 174:2369-2384 DOI 10.1007 terms. Because REU theory is not partition invariant, it is best understood as a ''grand world'' theory. It should take into account every possible eventuality of concern to the agent. But the treatment sketched in Risk and Rationality follows the usual, ''small world'' framing appropriate only to partition-invariant theories, like expected utility theory. Moving to the grand-world perspective hampers REU theory's ability to handle the Allais paradox. To recover the usual preferences, strong and implausible assumptions are required. Allais, EU, and REUBetween the two gambles A and B, which do you prefer?A ¼ ð$1 million; 1Þ B ¼ ð$0; :01; $1 million; :89; $5 million; :1ÞMost people prefer A to B. Better to walk away with a safe $1 million than to risk it all for a 10% chance at $5 million, even if that risk is a meagre 1% chance. Many of these same people prefer C to D given the following choice:C ¼ ð$0; :9; $5 million; :1Þ D ¼ ð$0; :89; $1 million; :11ÞWith a substantial chance of walking away empty-handed already on the table, they are willing to take on an extra 1% risk of empty-handedness in exchange for a 10% chance at $5 million. But, famously, expected utility theory forbids this combination of preferences (Allais 1953). If that trade-off is acceptable to you in the second case, it should be acceptable in the first case, too. So you can't simultaneously prefer A to B and C to D. 1 REU theory is more permissive here. It allows us to accept the trade-off between an extra 1% risk of empty-handedness and a 10% chance at $5 million in the risky context while rejecting it in the ''safe'' context, where a guaranteed $1 million is an option. Risk & Rationality illustrates with...