Rationale for the Article. Professional wargames have long been an integral part of the tool set used by the military. The literature includes many examples of wargames that have been successful in terms of training, military education, procurement, operational analysis and planning for war. However, retrospective examination demonstrates that many of these professional wargames also had major errors in them and by implication current games about future confrontations are similarly flawed. Nevertheless, the academic evidence is clear that such games are still invaluable tools. Methodology. Ten years of research into the development of wargames undertaken by the History of Wargaming Project has analysed and made generally available more professional wargames than ever before. Retrospective examination of a sample of these declassified games, from the British War Office Rules (1896) to more recent games about the Ukraine, shows significant errors. Value. Demonstrating that professional games had errors in the past opens challenges the overconfidence in the predictive capacity of games. It also raises the possibility for future research to identify game design bias and to develop better games in the future. Understanding the value of better games, even with their inherent issues, raise the possibility of better preparing decision makers for the future. Notes. The words wargame and game are used interchangeably in this article. Whilst the techniques used in professional gaming evolved from modelling the battlefield, modern professional gaming is increasingly focussed on other situations that are not war, such as state level confrontations, trade wars, politics, cyber conflict, banking crisis etc. Using the term wargame seems inappropriate when for example, gaming a shipping dispute. All the games referred to this article, unless otherwise noted, are professional wargames, used by military, government, public sector bodies and other parties directly involved in real world issues. The prefix professional has been omitted for brevity in most places.

Aim. This article gives an overview of how commercial computer game technology was introduced for training, education and decision support within the British Army. Value of the article. It records the narrative of the introduction and development of first person shooter computer games into the British Army; an area where developments are not routinely reported outside the closed world of defence training. Methodology. The research was based on interviews of key staff who worked in procurement at the Defence Academy of the UK and for the MoD during 2002 to 2012. The interviewees included two officers, an experienced defence contractor and a senior civil servant. These interviews were given on the understanding that the views expressed would not be individually attributable as they might not represent those of their current employers. The authors were also given access to a unique collection of documents, some of which were not publically available, but are held in the archives of the UK Defence Academy. These are cited in the bibliography. Limitations of the article. This article cites the evidence from the time that supported the continued use of what was a radical and contentious new way of training. Since the introduction of Virtual Battle Space 2 into the British Army, further research into the effectiveness of games based training in the military has been published. Analysis. Games based training has become a significant part of the training cycle for many parts of the British Army. These games have limitations, but are the only alternative to real operations for some types of training. However, the difficult topic of what is the correct proportion of games based training to other types? is a contested area within defence training in the UK. Conclusions. Initial evaluations on the effectiveness of the use of computer games in preparing UK forces for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan showed they had a significant positive impact. The first experience of the British Army with these games has secured the long-term application of this technology and it is unrealistic to imagine future military training without some degree of games technology.

8Aim To explore the professional application of Professor Nigel Howard's 1998 Confrontation 9 Analysis method of modelling political conflicts. 10 Case Study The Confrontation Analysis methodology was applied to the design of a political-11 military (pol-mil) game held at the UK's Defence Academy in 2011 to examine the future course 12 of the then current Libyan Civil War. 13 Methodology Confrontation Analysis provides a structured schema to help identify the parties 14 involved in a dispute, highlight the differences in their narratives, find the subsequent dilemmas 15 and attempt to resolve them to move the situation on. This helps provide rigour to analysis, 16 negotiation and decision making as it clearly documents initial policy positions and subsequent 17 changes through the use of cards which summarise each stakeholder's position at each stage. 18Value The methodology, used in conjunction with role-play and multi-player teams, was found 19 to have some utility, not in forecasting detailed outcomes, but in highlighting key aspects of the 20 potential development of the situation. This research concluded that Confrontation Analysis can 21 make a significant contribution to understanding and analyzing international crises as well as 22 assisting in formulating successful national policy. Confrontation Analysis can be also be an 23 invaluable part of a learning process for analysts and key decision makers facing real crises. 24 2 Word Count 4801 28 29 65were then arbitrated by the Game Director using their experience along with advice from 66 specialists, in a manner reminiscent of the free kriegsspiels of 19 th Century Germany (Allen, 67 1989; Smith, 2010). (In free kriesspiels combat outcomes are based on the recent combat 68 experience of the senior game moderators (Curry, 2008). Therefore, the realism of the game 69 outcomes was critically dependent on the skill and knowledge of the game moderators.) The 70 post-game debrief was collated into a thirty minute short film enlivened with archive shots of 71 riots, ships and troop movements consistent with the game's storyline. 4The American government recognised the value of these games for training; Griffin (1965) 73 reported that the games gave specialists a view outside their own field and participants learnt 74 about the pressures real world foreign policy operates in. The military reported that the games 75 gave them insights into problems that might otherwise have been overlooked. Thomas Schelling, 76 a Nobel Prize-winning academic who directed a number of games in the 1960's pioneered the 77 concept of bargaining in strategic behaviour (Schelling 1960 and 1966). Schelling said, "One 78 thing games could teach… was how little strategy, or even war was military; how it was less 79 concerned with the application of force than with the exploitation of potential forces. They could 80 teach the importance of communicating with one's opponents, not only by what one said, but by 81 what one did." Wilson (1968, p71). 82Since these early games, seminar w...

No abstract

No abstract