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The prosecution of smuggling of goods is bedeviled with procedural difficulties to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and so, does not follow the usual procedures of criminal justice. This article focuses on determining whether the reversal of the burden of proof, which is common to most customs laws, offends the general notion of presumption of innocence of the accused. The paper adopts a comparative analysis of relevant statutes and case law. It finds that statutes which impose the burden of proof on the accused in certain circumstances are valid but misapplied by the courts in Nigeria. Given the peculiar nature of smuggling, it is not difficult to appreciate the rationale for placing the burden on the accused to prove certain facts especially those within his peculiar knowledge. This will however not justify the misapplication of such provisions that reverse the burden of proof as was the case in Board of Customs and Excise v Ibrahim Barau. The paper recommends a judicial rethink that will ensure the proper application of section 190 of the Nigerian CEMA whenever the opportunity presents itself. Prosecution, Smuggling of Goods, Strict Liability Offences, Mental Fault, Intermediate Offences, Absolute Prohibition, Presumption of Innocence, Reversed Burden of Proof, Customs and Excise Laws, Nigeria

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