In this essay based on a decade of research among sreet vendors and the informal economy, I explore street vending and the informal sector within the context of the shift from modernism to postmodernism. Specifically, Modernism often implied crackdowns on street vendors because of the ideals of public order and state control. Postmodernism is more open to the informal sector as the economy disaggregates, but this also creates new dilemmas for the informal sector, as it is expected to solve the problems of the formal sector by becoming formal. I end with a suggestion that policy makers allow deregulated sectors of informality in the economy to function as incubators for new businesses.We typically think of street vending as a part of the premodern, traditional economic order that survives only on the fringes of modern society. How could something that we think of as premodern be associated with the (current) postmodern age? Our reasons for presenting the reader with this conundrum is rooted in our research on street vending in various countries-research that we began with the common assumption in mind that street vending should, by all logical criteria, eventually disappear. What we found, however, is that street vending, despite some problems and frequent attacks, is a thriving and growing phenomenon for reasons tied, we believe, to the current changes in the global economy that have been associated by many authors with postmodernity. 2If someone were asked 30 to 40 years ago what the future of commercial activity would be, they would probably enthusiastically talk about shopping centers, supermarkets and department stores: places where consumers could enjoy a variety of choices within a

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This book develops dynamic economic models using the perspective and analytic framework provided by psychological learning theory. This framework is used to resolve apparent contradictions between optimization theory, which lies at the heart of all modern economic theory, and day-to-day evidence that short-run economic behaviour cannot reasonably be described solely as the outcome of efficiently implemented self-interest. The author applies this viewpoint to a number of problem areas in which literal applications of maximization theory have not usually proved to be satisfactory. These include analyses of decision-making under uncertainty and gambling behaviour, the role of consumer-oriented advertising in influencing behaviour, the persistence of price dispersions in markets, and inflation.

This paper presents a discussion of the role of adapting expectations in the bargaining process. Negotiators are charactenzed as persons who choose bargaining strategies in their attempt to optimize their payoffs from the situation. These strategies are contingent on each party's perception of the strategy of his opponent, and if these perceptions contain errors, expectations will change and this will lead in turn to a modification of each party's strategy choice. The payoff demands and manipulative moves which charactenze the bargaining process are seen as combinations of actions which are specified in the original bargaining plans of the parties and of changes in the plans themselves. The influence of the learnmg process on the settlement point is described as well as some empirical implications of the theory in general. SOME ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON BARGAININGThe most cursory survey of the literature devoted to the bargaining problem is sufficient to impress one with the enormous diversity of opinion on the nature and function of bargaining processes. The breadth of this diversity is partially demonstrated by the variety of titles which have been assigned to papers in this journal. Evidently, one event which we all may agree to call a negotiation may nevertheless be described by several different scientists almost as though it were as many different kinds of event. The comparison and evaluation of existing theories has become a severe challenge because the aspects of bargain-