The New Year’s Eve 2015 mass sexual assaults in Germany led to a broader debate about whether the perpetrators, most of them self-identifying as Muslims, were encouraged to such acts by particularly sexist attitudes toward girls and women. Here, we argue that it is not the specific religious affiliation of individuals per se that predicts sexism. Rather it should be the extent to which they are involved in their religion, i.e., their religiosity and their endorsement of religious fundamentalism. In line with the theory of ambivalent sexism, we distinguish hostile and benevolent sexism, while controlling for right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. In two Pilot Studies, we explored differences in ambivalent sexism (a) between male and female individuals of Muslim faith, Christian faith, Muslim faith, Christian faith, and no religious affiliation residing in Germany, while at the same time (b) differentiating between sexism directed toward girls and sexism directed toward women. In our Main Study, we tested the interrelations between religiosity, religious fundamentalism, and ambivalent sexism in our religious subsamples of male Christians, female Christians, male Muslims, and female Muslims using a multigroup multivariate moderated mediation analysis. In all three studies, Muslims were more religious, endorsed religious fundamentalism more strongly, and held stronger benevolent sexist beliefs toward girls and women as well as stronger hostile sexist beliefs toward women than Christians and non-religious participants. In our Main Study, with female Christians as the reference group, male Muslims’ stronger benevolent and hostile sexist beliefs toward girls were mediated by religiosity and fundamentalism. Female Muslims’ stronger endorsement of benevolent sexism toward girls could be explained by their higher level of fundamentalism. While our findings show that differences in ambivalent sexism between religious groups were partly due to different levels of religiosity and fundamentalism, they also suggest that there are factors other than those investigated in our studies responsible for male Muslims’ particularly strong sexism. We discuss specific contents of Islamic religious teachings and honor beliefs as possible causes to be investigated further in future research.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, people have been exposed to vast amounts of misinformation. This “infodemic” has undermined key behavioural and pharmacological measures to contain the pandemic. In a cross-sectional survey of residents of Germany, we investigated the perceived prevalence of misinformation, the strategies people reported using to discern between true and false information, and individual differences in beliefs in misinformation at three time points from June 2020 to February 2021 (N = 3324). We observed four main results. First, there was an increase in the perceived prevalence of misinformation over time. Second, the most believed false claims included that the virus is no worse than the flu and that the EU has approved dangerous vaccines. Third, belief in misinformation was associated with support for the far-right AfD party; reliance on tabloids, neighbours and social media for information; lower levels of education; and migration background. Fourth, only about half of the respondents reported using strategies such as checking for consistency between different sources to identify misinformation. These results can inform the development of interventions, such as boosting the ability to discern accurate from misleading information, or enriching specific environments (e.g., neighbourhoods with high rates of migration) with accessible and high-quality information.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, citizens have been exposed to vast amounts of mis- and disinformation. This “infodemic” has undermined key behavioural and pharmacological measures to contain the pandemic—for instance, by increasing vaccine hesitancy. In a cross-sectional survey of residents of Germany, we investigated citizens’ perceptions of and ability to deal with misinformation across three Waves of data collection in 2020/21 (Ntotal = 3324). We observed three main results. First, there was a strong increase in the perceived prevalence of misinformation in classic and online media and in social interactions over the course of the pandemic. Second, some—but by no means all—respondents knew how to identify misinformation. Third, higher susceptibility to misinformation was associated with support for the far-right AFD party, reliance on tabloids, neighbours and social media for information and news, lower education, as well as migration background. To help people navigate the challenges of the infodemic, we propose a two-pronged approach, namely, to boost individuals’ abilities to discern false from accurate information, and to enrich citizens’ proximate environments (e.g., neighbourhoods with high rates of migration) with reliable, accessible and high-quality information.