Scholars examining the cross-national mobility of capital have followed two distinct paths. Economists tend to focus on the determinants and economic effects of cross-country capital movements while political scientists largely concentrate on the political impact of capital mobility. This study fills an important gap in the literature by examining the effects of economic policy outcomes on capital inflows to developing countries, explicitly comparing the reactions of portfolio and direct investors. I find that portfolio investors are in fact sensitive to past government behavior and fiscal policy outcomes; portfolio investors reallocate funds as new information about government policy becomes available. Direct investors, on the other hand, are not sensitive to macrolevel economic policy outcomes but are concerned with political institutions. Countries with more stable and democratic political institutions attract more FDI. These findings have implications for developing country governments as they consider the sequence of market liberalizing reforms.

Leaders are part of virtually all organized political life. There have been important recent advances in modeling "leaders" as well as clever and innovative empirical studies. We review recent contributions from the political science, economics, and management literatures. We discuss the extent to which these new works represent advances over the major classic works on leadership and organization from the twentieth century. We identify important gaps, chief among them (a) theorizing a role for coercion, (b) modeling the endogenous emergence of leaders, and (c) empirically disentangling the effect of an individual leader from her office, especially when leaders emerge endogenously.

Decades of research across several disciplines have produced substantial evidence that labor unions, on balance, reduce economic disparities. But unions are complicated, multifaceted organizations straddling markets and politics. Much of their equality-promoting influence occurs through their ability to reduce class-based inequity in politics and public policy. Declining unionization across much of the developed world is eroding workers' bargaining power. Reduced economic leverage puts pressure on union solidarity and weakens labor-based political movements. Important research design problems and significant heterogeneity across unions, regions, countries, and time imply a continued need for more work.