Analyzing political conservatism as motivated social cognition integrates theories of personality (authoritarianism, dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs (for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system justification). A meta-analysis (88 samples, 12 countries, 22,818 cases) confirms that several psychological variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety (weighted mean r ϭ .50); system instability (.47); dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity (.34); openness to experience (-.32); uncertainty tolerance (-.27); needs for order, structure, and closure (.26); integrative complexity (-.20); fear of threat and loss (.18); and self-esteem (-.09). The core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat.Conservatism is a demanding mistress and is giving me a migraine.-George F. Will, BuntsFor more than half a century, psychologists have been tracking the hypothesis that different psychological motives and tendencies underlie ideological differences between the political left and the right. The practice of singling out political conservatives for special study began with Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford's (1950) landmark study of authoritarianism and the fascist potential in personality. An asymmetrical focus on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) was criticized heavily on theoretical and methodological grounds (e.g., Christie, 1954;Eysenck, 1954;Rokeach, 1960;Shils, 1954), but it has withstood the relentless tests of time and empirical scrutiny (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981Altemeyer, , 1988Altemeyer, , 1996Altemeyer, , 1998Billig, 1984;Brown, 1965;Christie, 1991;Elms, 1969;Sidanius, 1985;W. F. Stone, 1980;W. F. Stone, Lederer, & Christie, 1993;Tetlock, 1984;Wilson, 1973c). A voluminous literature, which we review here, facilitates the comparison of cognitive styles and motivational needs of political conservatives with those of moderates, liberals, radicals, and left-wingers. In addition to classic and contemporary approaches to authoritarianism, we cover less obvious sources of theory and research on individual differences associated with dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, need for cognitive closure, and social dominance orientation (SDO) insofar as each of these psychological variables contributes to a deeper and more nuanced understanding of political conservatism.The study of authoritarianism and other personality theories of political attitudes is often dismissed a priori as an illegitimate, value-laden attempt to correlate general psychological profiles with specific ideological beliefs (e.g., Durrheim, 1997; J. L. Martin, 2001;Ray, 1988). The psychological study of ideological conservatism is one that invites controversy (e.g., Redding, 2001;Sears, 1994;Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996;Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986;Tetlock, 1994;Tetlock & Mitchell,...

Most theories in social and political psychology stress self-interest, intergroup conflict, ethnocentrism, homophily, ingroup bias, outgroup antipathy, dominance, and resistance. System justification theory is influenced by these perspectives-including social identity and social dominance theories-but it departs from them in several respects. Advocates of system justification theory argue that (a) there is a general ideological motive to justify the existing social order, (b) this motive is at least partially responsible for the internalization of inferiority among members of disadvantaged groups, (c) it is observed most readily at an implicit, nonconscious level of awareness and (d) paradoxically, it is sometimes strongest among those who are most harmed by the status quo. This article reviews and integrates 10 years of research on 20 hypotheses derived from a system justification perspective, focusing on the phenomenon of implicit outgroup favoritism among members of disadvantaged groups (including African Americans, the elderly, and gays/lesbians) and its relation to political ideology (especially liberalism-conservatism).KEY WORDS: ideology, system justification, intergroup relations, implicit bias There is a cluster of related theories that are by now so prevalent in social science that they strike the contemporary reader as self-evidently true. Although these theories are by no means indistinguishable, they share a set of common features, including the tenets that groups serve their own interests, develop ideolo-

Although the concept of justification has played a significant role in many social psychological theories, its presence in recent examinations of stereotyping has been minimal. We describe and evaluate previous notions of stereotyping as ego‐justification and group‐justification and propose an additional account, that of system‐justification, which refers to psychological processes contributing to the preservation of existing social arrangements even at the expense of personal and group interest. It is argued that the notion of system‐justification is necessary to account for previously unexplained phenomena, most notably the participation by disadvantaged individuals and groups in negative stereotypes of themselves, and the consensual nature of stereotypic beliefs despite differences in social relations within and between social groups. We offer a selective review of existing research that demonstrates the role of stereotypes in the production of false consciousness and develop the implications of a system‐justification approach. [T]he rationalizing and justifying function of a stereotype exceeds its function as a reflector of group attributes—G. W. Allport (1958, p. 192).

Ideology has re-emerged as an important topic of inquiry among social, personality, and political psychologists. In this review, we examine recent theory and research concerning the structure, contents, and functions of ideological belief systems. We begin by defining the construct and placing it in historical and philosophical context. We then examine different perspectives on how many (and what types of) dimensions individuals use to organize their political opinions. We investigate (a) how and to what extent individuals acquire the discursive contents associated with various ideologies, and (b) the social-psychological functions that these ideologies serve for those who adopt them. Our review highlights "elective affinities" between situational and dispositional needs of individuals and groups and the structure and contents of specific ideologies. Finally, we consider the consequences of ideology, especially with respect to attitudes, evaluations, and processes of system justification.

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