Objectives: Traditional theories of motor learning (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967), along with certain contemporary psychological perspectives (e.g., Weiss & Reber, 2012;Wulf, 2013), postulate that expert performers must relinquish paying conscious attention to, and/or attempting to exert control over, their bodily movements in order to achieve optimal performance. Challenging such largely unquestioned conceptual approaches, however, is an emerging body of evidence (e.g., see Montero, 2010;Shusterman, 2011) which indicates that 'somatic reflection' (i.e., a conscious focus on bodily movement) is an important mediator of continuous improvement (i.e., the fact that certain performers continue to improve their skills even after becoming experts) at the elite level of sport. The present position paper seeks to elucidate and resolve this apparent paradox concerning the role of bodily awareness in expertise. Method: To achieve this latter aim, we draw on empirical evidence (e.g., from research on somatic attention) and theory (e.g., Shusterman's, 2008, theory of body consciousness) to elucidate the role of bodily awareness in facilitating continuous improvement at the elite level of sport. Results and conclusion: In doing so, we sketch some theoretical and practical implications of Shusterman's (2008Shusterman's ( , 2011Shusterman's ( , 2012) theory of 'somaesthetics' for contemporary research on expertise in sport.

Theorists have used the concept of habitus to explain how skilled agents are capable of responding in an infinite number of ways to the infinite number of possible situations that they encounter in their field of practice. According to some perspectives, habitus is seen to represent a form of regulated improvisation that functions below the threshold of consciousness. However, Bourdieu argued that rational and conscious computation may be required in situations of ‘crisis’ where habitus proves insufficient as a basis for our actions. In the current article, I draw on a range of evidence which indicates that conscious intervention (including self-reflective sensory consciousness) is required not only at points of crisis but also as skilled performers engage in the mundane actions/practices that characterize their everyday training and performance regimes. The interaction of conscious learning and unconscious schemata leads to the development of a reflexive habitus which allows performers to refine and adapt embodied movement patterns over time.

Background: Clinical practice guidelines for the treatment of low back pain suggest the inclusion of a biopsychosocial approach in which patient self-management is prioritized. While many physiotherapists recognise the importance of evidence-based practice, there is an evidence practice gap that may in part be due to the fact that promoting self-management necessitates change in clinical behaviours. Evidence suggests that a patient's motivation and maintenance of self-management behaviours can be positively influenced by the clinician's use of an autonomy supportive communication style. Therefore, the aim of this study was to develop and pilot-test the feasibility of a theoretically derived implementation intervention to support physiotherapists in using an evidence-based autonomy supportive communication style in practice for promoting patient self-management in clinical practice.

Dreyfus and Dreyfus' (1986) influential phenomenological analysis of skill acquisition proposes that expert performance is guided by non-cognitive responses which are fast, effortless and apparently intuitive in nature. Although this model has been criticised (e.g.,

Classical theories of skill acquisition propose that automatization (i.e., performance requires progressively less attention as experience is acquired) is a defining characteristic of expertise in a variety of domains (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967). Automaticity is believed to enhance smooth and efficient skill execution by allowing performers to focus on strategic elements of performance rather than on the mechanical details that govern task implementation (Williams & Ford, 2008). By contrast, conscious processing (i.e., paying conscious attention to one's action during motor execution) has been found to disrupt skilled movement and performance proficiency (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001). On the basis of this evidence, researchers have tended to extol the virtues of automaticity. However, few researchers have considered the wide range of empirical evidence which indicates that highly automated behaviors can, on occasion, lead to a series of errors that may prove deleterious to skilled performance. Therefore, the purpose of the current paper is to highlight the perils, rather than the virtues, of automaticity. We draw on Reason's (1990) classification scheme of everyday errors to show how an overreliance on automated procedures may lead to 3 specific performance errors (i.e., mistakes, slips, and lapses) in a variety of skill domains (e.g., sport, dance, music). We conclude by arguing that skilled performance requires the dynamic interplay of automatic processing and conscious processing in order to avoid performance errors and to meet the contextually contingent demands that characterize competitive environments in a range of skill domains.