Abstract.  Applying the demand‐side claims of Kitschelt's theory, and the expectation that electoral systems affect voter choice, this article provides an explanation of cross‐national variation in support for new radical right (NRR) parties between 1982 and 1995. After discussing concepts and measures, two versions of qualitative comparative analysis (Boolean analysis and fuzzy‐set analysis) are applied to data for ten West European countries. The results suggest that, in combination with electoral systems that had larger district magnitudes, NRR strength resulted from a restructuring of the space of party competition due to post‐industrialism and growth in the welfare state. Convergence between major parties of the left and right was not among the combination of conditions that led to NRR success. Apart from demonstrating that fuzzy‐set analysis can yield a simpler explanation than Boolean analysis, this study reveals anomalous NRR outcomes for Austria, Belgium and France.

This chapter examines radical right publishers, intellectual schools, parallel organizations, voluntary associations, small groups, political sects, and families. Party and non-party sectors of the radical right share common projects. They interact with each other, and the boundaries between their memberships, social networks, and formal or informal organizations overlap. Yet the non-party sector retains important specificities. Apart from identifying its social bases, main activities, organizational forms, and ideological orientations, this chapter attends to variations across Europe and between Europe and the United States. The conclusion proposes directions for future research: (1) fill in empirical gaps that emerge from an overview of the literature, (2) examine if interaction between economic globalization and welfare protection explains the strength of the non-party sector, and (3) test the hypothesis that a centripetal party system with a weak boundary between moderate and radical right favors the non-party sector of the radical right.

Does the left-right cleavage still structure citizen political behavior? What are the explanatory limits of cleavage politics? These questions are examined in light of support for a contemporary far right party, France's National Front. Though the predominance of former moderate right voters testifies to the cleavage's enduring influence, the weight of former left voters (especially those from the non-Communist left) indicates the importance of citizen concern with crosscutting political issues. Beyond voter movement from left and moderate right parties alike, however, explanation of far right success must also attend to the contribution of previous non-voters as well as the emergence of a new partisan loyalty.

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Nous examinons la thèse de Ronald Inglehart selon laquelle le postmatérialisme est un phénomène politique universel qui concerne toute société industrialisée avancée. Après avoir introduit une distinction entre systèmes politiques réactifs et non réactifs, nous proposons que, dans les systèmes réactifs, le clivage matérialiste s'est enracinéà un tel point qu'il triomphait encore du postmatérialisme. Par contre, le postmatérialisme a réussi à se démarquer dans les systèmes non réactifs, ceux où le clivage matérialiste avait toujours été plus faible. Nous soutenons que les données tirées des sondages nationaux tenus lors des élections canadiennes de 1984 et 1997 confirment notre hypothèse sur les effets des systèmes non réactifs. Bien que le Canada soit l'objet principal de notre analyse, dans la conclusion nous nous penchons sur des facteurs qui pourraient expliquer les différences dans le postmatérialisme aux niveaux provincial et international. This article disputes Inglehart's claim that postmaterialism is a uniform political phenomenon that transcends differences between advanced industrial societies. We distinguish responsive from unresponsive political systems and argue that, in responsive systems, the materialist cleavage became so deeply entrenched that postmaterialism could not vie for dominance. In contrast, postmaterialism has become more salient than materialism in unresponsive systems, where the materialist cleavage was weaker to begin with. We argue that data from the Canadian National Election Surveys of 1984 and 1997 are consistent with our prediction about the effect of unresponsiveness. Differences within the Canadian electorate became weaker for materialist issues but more pronounced for postmate‐rialist issues between 1984 and 1997. Although our empirical analysis focusses on Canada, we conclude by speculating about the causes of cross‐provincial and cross‐national variations in postmaterialism.