Objective: There have been five documented outbreaks of Ebola Reston virus (RESTV) in animals epidemiologically linked to the Philippines. This assessment was conducted to determine the risk of RESTV occurring in humans in the Philippines and its potential pathogenicity in humans. Methods: The World Health Organization Rapid Risk Assessment of Acute Public Health Events Manual was used for the assessment. A literature review was done and a risk assessment matrix was used for the risk characterization of the outbreaks in the Philippines. The risk assessment was conducted by the Philippines Field Epidemiology Training Program. Results: The risk of RESTV occurring in humans in the Philippines and its potential pathogenicity in humans were both assessed as moderate. Animals involved in RESTV outbreaks in the Philippines were non-human primates and domestic pigs. The presence of RESTV in pigs poses a possibility of genetic evolution of the virus. Although RESTV has been identified in humans, there was no death or illness attributed to the infection. The Philippines Inter-agency Committee on Zoonoses oversees collaboration between the animal and human health sectors for the prevention and control of zoonoses. However, there is no surveillance of risk animals or previously affected farms to monitor and facilitate early identification of cases. Discussion: The moderate risk of RESTV recurring among humans in the Philippines and its potential pathogenicity in humans reinforces the need for early detection, surveillance and continued studies of RESTV pathogenesis and its health consequences. The One Health approach, with the involvement and coordination of public health, veterinary services and the community, is essential in the detection, control and management of zoonosis.

IntroductionIn July 2015, the Philippines conducted a school-based mass drug administration using albendazole for soil-transmitted helminths infection. Reports of adverse events were subsequently made through the event-based surveillance system, mostly from the Zamboanga Peninsula on the island of Mindanao. A team from the Epidemiology Bureau investigated the reports of adverse events following mass drug administration (AEFMDA).MethodsFive schools were identified for the investigation which comprised an unmatched case-control study, key informant interviews and laboratory examinations. AEFMDA cases were students who had sudden onset of abdominal pain, vomiting, diarrhoea, loss of consciousness, headache or dizziness within 24 hours after intake of deworming tablet; controls were healthy students who did not develop signs and symptoms after deworming.ResultsMost (85%) of the 7313 AEFMDA cases reported nationwide were from Zamboanga Peninsula. Most reports were made after rumours of deaths following deworming and of the use of expired drug were spread through the region. Many parents sent their children to hospital, even if asymptomatic. The case-control study found that being an AEFMDA case was associated with no history of previous deworming (odds ratio = 4.08, 95% confidence interval: 1.77–9.42).DiscussionThe investigation concluded that epidemic hysteria was the cause of the increased number of AEFMDA cases in the Zamboanga Peninsula. The false information, aggravated by social media, caused panic and an increase in reporting. Some cases had no history of deworming, and they may not have been aware that albendazole is safe and that side-effects are expected. Risk communication before, during and after future national deworming programmes are recommended to prevent unnecessary reporting of AEFMDA.

Introduction:The Philippines Department of Health uses the Philippine Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (PIDSR) system to monitor 25 diseases and syndromes that have the potential to cause outbreaks. The focus of this system is to strengthen the capacity of local government units for early detection and response to outbreaks. After Typhoon Haiyan, routine disease surveillance activities were suspended at the Epidemiology and Surveillance Units (ESUs) at the city and provincial levels, as well as laboratory services; surveillance resumed as soon as local conditions allowed. Method:We conducted an assessment of PIDSR in March 2015, 16 months post-Haiyan, in Region 8, the most heavily affected region. We used key informant interviews and a review of data from the system to assess the core surveillance and support functions.Results: All ESUs reported they were performing all surveillance core functions, although laboratory confirmation needed to be strengthened at the regional reference laboratory. Access to working communication equipment also needed improvement as did timeliness and completeness of reporting.Discussion: Assessment of surveillance activities, resources and quality should be conducted post-disaster. The strength and operations of the disease surveillance system usually requires support from the local, regional and national governments, especially if there are legal mandates and legislation that includes the system in disaster planning. Regular monitoring of the system is recommended to ensure stability, system development, increased outbreak detection and fewer morbidities and fatalities.