According to the bootstraping problem, any view that allows for basic knowledge (knowledge obtained from a reliable source prior to one's knowing that that source is reliable) is forced to accept that one can utilize a track-record argument to acquire justification for believing that one's belief source is reliable; yet, we tend to think that acquiring justification in this way is too easy. In this paper I argue, first, that those who respond to the bootstrapping problem by denying basic knowledge succumb to over-intellectualizing epistemology, and secondly, reliabilist views avoid over-intellectualization only at the expense of sanctioning bootstrapping as a benign procedure. Both of these outcomes are difficult to bear. To ward off each of these unsavory outcomes, I propose an alternative solution that draws on a distinction between two separate epistemic concepts: entitlement and justification.Reliabilists endorse the following claim: S's belief that p is justified if and only if S's belief was produced by G, where G is a reliable source of information. In recent years the bootstrapping problempresented independently by Richard Fumerton (1995), Jonathan Vogel (2000), and Steward Cohen (2002)has been offered as a devastating objection to reliabilism. 1 To illustrate the problem, suppose that Reggie has a highly reliable perceptual system. Having never before thought about whether his system is reliable, he crafts the following track-record argument: 2 B1. There is an Fa ahead (based on an occurrent perceptual experience) B2. My current experience represents a as being F (via introspection) B3. So, on this occasion my perceptual experience is accurate After conducting numerous similar procedures of the (B1-B3) sort, Reggie infers:1 The target view attacked by the three authors mentioned here is reliabilism about knowledge. In this paper I shall follow several writers (Zalabardo, 2005;Vogel, 2008;Kallestrup, 2009) by concentrating on justification or warrant, rather than knowledge.2 Track-record arguments were first discussed in Alston (1996).

William Alston's argument against epistemological deontologism rests upon two key premises: first, that we lack a suitable amount of voluntary control with respect to our beliefs, and, second, the principle that -ought‖ implies -can.‖ While several responses to Alston have concerned rejecting either of these two premises, I argue that even on the assumption that both premises are true, there is room to be made for deontologism in epistemology. I begin by offering a criticism of Richard Feldman's invaluable work on ‗role-oughts,' whereupon I develop my own positive view in light of Feldman's shortcomings. The upshot is that while we as epistemic agents are not responsible for the beliefs we form, we are nonetheless responsible for the various bodily or mental activities that typically bear a causal influence on belief formation.

No abstract

The Disjunction Problem states that teleological theories of perception cannot explain why a subject represents an F when an F causes the perception and not the disjunction F v G, given that the subject has mistaken G’s for F’s in the past.  Without a suitable answer, non-veridical representation becomes impossible to explain.  Here, I defend Burge’s teleological theory of perception against the Disjunction Problem, arguing that a perceptual state’s representing a disjunctive property is incompatible with perceptual anti-individualism.  Because anti-individualism is at the heart of Burge’s theory, I conclude that Burgeans need not be concerned with the Disjunction Problem.

What are the implications for perceptual anti-individualism for radical scepticism about perceptual entitlement? Previous ambitious arguments are criticized: one can only know a posteriori the extent of perceptual entitlement. But one can know a priori that one is not the only sentient being to have ever existed. Brueckner presented a reconstruction of an argument thought to be discernible in Burge’s “Perceptual Entitlement.” It was supposed to be an a priori argument for the existence of perceptual entitlement. Though it was not touted as such, the argument would be a kind of a priori anti-skeptical argument. For if it could be demonstrated a priori that we have entitlement to hold our perceptual beliefs, then this would answer a skeptic who claimed that our perceptual beliefs have no positive epistemic status, given our inability to rule out his skeptical counterpossibilities in a manner that itself possesses positive epistemic status.