This paper presents newly constructed series on human capital in Sweden 1870-2000. The estimates are based on enrolment in different forms of education, stretching as far back as 1812, and the size and age distribution of the population within age range 15-65 years. The secular accumulation of human capital has closely matched the long-term trend in aggregate productivity and both grew at a rate of 2.4% annually. Our estimates differ significantly from the data attributed to Sweden in the international short-cut estimates of human capital for the period since 1960. The basic question addressed is about causality: whether human capital causes economic growth or if causality goes in the other direction. We address this problem with modified Granger-causality tests. According to our results, changes in the stock of human capital have in a systematic way preceded changes in aggregate productivity up to the structural crisis in the 1970s. This allows us to conclude that human capital has been a causal factor in Swedish economic growth since the industrialisation. However, after 1975, the growth of human capital has not been able to match the demands of the third industrial revolution.

No abstract

This article explores the development of market integration within the Baltic Sea region and with England, from the 1840s to the late 1880s. It exploits two new datasets on grain prices. The degree of market integration is estimated using a wavelet variant of dynamic factor analysis that takes account of both time and distance. Additionally, we use the London corn market as the benchmark for the degree of market integration. Our results show that the role of distance disappeared in the wheat and rye, but not in the oats and barley trade, as the Baltic Sea Region became integrated into the Atlantic economy.

No abstract

This article scrutinises the role of structural change and foreign trade in the Nordic countries, except Iceland, in industrialization prior to 1914. Sector contribution to GDP as well as the role of the foreign trade is compared across the countries. The comparison uncovers different paths to industrialization that cannot be explained by reference to received views, such as the shock of free trade or open economy forces. Denmark was not only richer than the rest of the 'Nordic Periphery' but also earlier in industrialization. Furthermore, agriculture had a much neglected role in Swedish catch-up, and despite its relatively large export sector, Norway lagged behind, as did Finland. Economic growth was characterised not only by rising exports but also by capital imports and increasing consumption, indicating wider economic and social change. Different sector structures in the Nordic countries largely explain why there was no clear pattern of catch-up or convergence, neither in the region nor in relation to the Western European leaders. We conclude that the social capability of the Nordic countries to integrate and respond to external influences 1850Á1914 must be seen in the perspective of the evolving domestic markets and the prior establishment of market institutions.