There is very little reported information on the content of the warm-up period in dressage horses. Our objective was to quantify warm-up content, patterns and duration in a simulated competition (field) environment in British dressage horses. Twelve elite (Group A) and 20 non-elite (Group B) mixed-breed dressage horses, all ridden by advanced level riders, were assessed. Riders warmed-up as they would normally for a competition prior to completing a test. The warm-up was videoed and assessed retrospectively. Total duration, time spent in the different paces, and on which rein, was recorded, along with information on which movements were performed, and the head and neck position. Appropriate statistical tests were used to compare variables between groups. Mean warm-up duration, time in walk and trot did not differ between groups, however Group A horses spent significantly more time in canter than Group B horses (P=0.0024). Group A horses also spent significantly more time in collected and extended paces, and performing advanced movements than Group B horses (P≤0.0421 for all variables). There was no difference in time spent on the left and right rein in either group. Results provide novel information on the warm-up content in a competition (field) environment for dressage horses. The findings indicate that that the content of the warm-up of elite and non-elite dressage horses was significantly different, with elite horses warming up for longer, spending more time in canter, performing more changes within paces and advanced movements. Dressage horses appear to warm-up more symmetrically than has been reported in jumping horses.

uch of the legal and ideological infrastructure that would later constitute the war on terror was introduced onto the U.S. political scene in the 1990s. Osama bin Laden was on President Clinton's intelligence and law enforcement radar screens; antiterrorism legislation that would significantly expand presidential and police powers was debated in Congress; and conservative advocacy groups such as the Project for a New American Century urged a more assertive projection of American power, including forcible regime change in Iraq. But it was the George W. Bush administration that provided these diverse events with a holistic superstructure in the form of the ''global war on terror.'' Almost overnight, following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, this narrative became the prevailing organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy, taking the attacks as its starting point and scripting the final act as an American victory in some undetermined future. The global war on terror acted as what, in the language of semiotics, is called a ''floating signifier,'' able to be attached at will to a wide range of actions and policies. Thus, the al-Qaeda perpetrators of September 11 and Saddam Hussein were organized into seamless and coherent chapters in the same account. The war on terror narrative led directly to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, to the establishment of an archipelago of detention camps, and to a vast expansion of surveillance systems inside the United States. The costs of the war have been staggering. Politically, the United States has forfeited its reputation as an icon for democracy and justice, even among its closest allies. Ethically, as a recent report from the International Commission of Jurists sets out, it has undermined its moral authority by having flouted the internationally accepted rules of war. 1 Economically, total external costs for the global war on terror as of the end of 2008 approached $900 billion (not including spending on homeland security). 2

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