How is the burden of proof to be distributed among individuals who are involved in resolving a particular issue? Under what conditions should the burden of proof be distributed unevenly? We distinguish attitudinal from dialectical burdens and argue that these questions should be answered differently, depending on which is in play. One has an attitudinal burden with respect to some proposition when one is required to possess sufficient evidence for it. One has a dialectical burden with respect to some proposition when one is required to provide supporting arguments for it as part of a deliberative process. We show that the attitudinal burden with respect to certain propositions is unevenly distributed in some deliberative contexts, but in all of these contexts, establishing the degree of support for the proposition is merely a means to some other deliberative end, such as action guidance, or persuasion. By contrast, uneven distributions of the dialectical burden regularly further the aims of deliberation, even in contexts where the quest for truth is the sole deliberative aim, rather than merely a means to some different deliberative end. We argue that our distinction between these two burdens resolves puzzles about unevenness that have been raised in the literature.

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There has been much recent interest in logics for questions and commands. The authors approve, but they argue that methodological issues must be addressed, before it is possible to understand what such logics are for and what they should be like. In particular, the authors deny that the formulas in such logics correspond directly to sentences in ordinary language. Logic is not linguistics. What then are the semantics for the formulas of logics of questions and commands? The focus here is mostly on questions. The authors argue that logics designed to capture the conditions for correct reasoning involving questions require a semantics that treats question-answer pairs as values. They also argue that formal dialogue approaches to the logic of questions should be interpreted in the light of the denial that logic is about language.

One example of the impressive breadth, depth, and deep interconnectedness of Fine’s work concerns his views about what sorts of entities we should commit ourselves to, as philosophers. In “The Question of Ontology” he challenges existing accounts of the philosophical task of ontology, rejecting a Quinean concern with what there is in favor of a focus on what entities are real. Fine thinks such a notion of reality is primitive, although linked to the notion of being ungrounded. The present chapter constitutes a critique of Fine’s interconnected set of ideas about the task of ontology, and defends the ability of quantificational constructions to capture ontological commitments, while questioning the usefulness to ontology of a primitive concept of reality.

Philosophers frequently defend definitions by appealing to intuitions and contemporary folk classificatory norms. I raise methodological concerns that undermine some of these defenses. Focusing on Andrew Kania's recent definition of music, I argue that the way in which it has been developed leads to problems, and I show that a number of other definitions of interest to philosophers of art (and others) run into similar problems.