There is a growing debate over the extent of consensus or divergence found within interdisciplinary International Studies (IS) programs. Unfortunately, with a few exceptions, this debate has taken place in the absence of empirical data. This article advances our understanding of the current state of IS curricula through an analysis of data generated from a survey of 140 interdisciplinary undergraduate IS majors across the United States. The surveyed programs comprise 63 Doctoral/Research institutions, 40 Master's institutions, and 37 Baccalaureate institutions found in 38 states and the District of Columbia. The 140 programs are analyzed in terms of six basic components: introductory course(s), research methods, capstone course(s), area and/or thematic concentrations, study abroad, and foreign language requirements. The findings demonstrate significant areas of both consensus and divergence in IS programs.

We challenge the widely accepted proposition that democratic leaders are more accountable than autocratic leaders. We argue that a winning coalition's abilities to monitor and sanction a leader increase as its size decreases. Hence, contrary to conventional wisdom, our theory suggests that autocratic leaders are more accountable than democratic leaders due to the monitoring and sanctioning advantages of smaller coalitions relative to larger coalitions. Many international relations scholars hold that the conventional wisdom explains important variation in leaders' behavior during crisis bargaining and in the outcomes of international disputes.We evaluate our theory and the conventional perspective by examining rival predictions regarding leaders' ability to avoid incurring audience costs by conducting crisis negotiations and making concessions outside their coalitions' view. A reassessment of US-USSR diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a favored case of the

Why do leaders draw attention to some cooperative security negotiations but shroud others in secrecy? Previous scholarship focuses on leaders' efforts to gain better terms of agreement either by playing their cards close to the vest at the bargaining table or by leveraging/avoiding aroused public opinion at home. Yet, in many cases, it is neither dyadic nor domestic political pressures that motivate leaders' decisions to publicly acknowledge or conceal the occurrence of talks. This article suggests, instead, that third-party states often constitute the primary targets of official secrecy and that a state's international power position shapes its decision to conceal or acknowledge military cooperation by affecting the size and attentiveness of international audiences, the types of assets it brings to the relationship and the benefits it seeks from cooperation. I test five hypotheses about leaders' use of secrecy and acknowledgment through a statistical analysis of an original dataset on US overseas military basing negotiations. This analysis produces strong support for my argument.

No abstract

No abstract