Many prominent theorists have argued that accurate perceptions of the self, the world, and the future are essential for mental health. Yet considerable research evidence suggests that overly positive selfevaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human thought. Moreover, these illusions appear to promote other criteria of mental health, including the ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in productive and creative work. These strategies may succeed, in large part, because both the social world and cognitive-processing mechanisms impose niters on incoming information that distort it in a positive direction; negative information may be isolated and represented in as unthreatening a manner as possible. These positive illusions may be especially useful when an individual receives negative feedback or is otherwise threatened and may be especially adaptive under these circumstances.

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In 1988, we published an article that challenged the notion that accurate perceptions of self and the world are essential for mental health (Taylor & Brown, 1988). We argued instead that people's perceptions in these domains are positively biased and that these positive illusions promote psychological well-being. In the current article, we review our theoretical model, correct certain misconceptions in its empirical application, and address the criticisms made by Colvin and Block.

Four studies examined how the characteristics of others affect people's self-appraisals. Ss viewed photographs of physically attractive or unattractive targets, then rated their own attractiveness. Study 1 found evidence for a contrast effect: Ss' self-appraisals were more favorable after viewing an unattractive same-sex target than after viewing an attractive same-sex target. Study 2 manipulated psychological closeness by varying the degree to which the S and the target shared similar attitudes and values. Although contrast effects occurred when the S and the target were dissimilar, the reverse tended to be true when the S and the target were related by virtue of their perceived similarity. Two additional studies extended these results, using a different operational definition of psychological closeness. The findings indicate that psychological closeness determines how other people's characteristics affect the self-concept.

Low self-esteem people are assumed to have more severe emotional reactions to failure than are high self-esteem people, but this assumption has not received consistent empirical support. In this article the authors report 2 investigations that found that self-esteem differences of this sort emerge for emotions that directly implicate the self (e.g., pride, humiliation) but not for emotions that do not directly implicate the self (e.g., happiness, unhappiness). Additional evidence suggested that this occurs, in part, because low self-esteem people overgeneralize the negative implications of failure. The relevance of these findings for understanding the nature and functions of self-esteem is considered.