Asymmetric regulation as applied to mobile termination rates refers to regulatory arrangements in which different mobile operators charge different termination rates, even though the services provided are essentially identical. The asymmetric regulation has been frequently used as a regulatory tool to support new entrants to a mobile market. This paper examines the economic effects of asymmetric regulation of mobile termination rates using a theoretical model and its simulation. The result shows that when there is no noticeable difference in brand loyalty between mobile operators with the high degree of substitutability between services provided by mobile operators, and the costs of new entrants are low, a reduction in the asymmetry of mobile access prices results in an enhancement of consumer welfare. These findings provide positive evidence for the argument that in certain situations asymmetric pricing of mobile access services may be counterproductive for consumer welfare.

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As construction in urban centers increases internationally, many concrete infrastructures are being built at 100 m or more underground, and the influence of groundwater on these facilities is also increasing. Accordingly, the importance of waterproofing and leak-proofing technology for securing long-term durability and safety of underground concrete facilities has been greatly emphasized. The most important required performance of such leak repair technology is to withstand structural behavior and groundwater pressure well. Currently, as a leak repair material for underground concrete facilities, a synthetic rubber-based polymer rubber gel with adhesive flexibility is used internationally. However, quantitative data on how deep the material can perform underground are lacking. In general, the water pressure resistance evaluation of leak repair materials only checks whether it withstands the water pressure of 30 m (0.3 MPa) underground. Therefore, in this study, the toughness of the synthetic rubber polymerized gel (SPRG) leak repair material was calculated using three factors: viscosity, cohesive strength (adhesion strength), and elongation, and an analysis method that can be replaced with water pressure resistance was proposed. In addition, in the correlation between toughness and underground water pressure, it was possible to find out the thickness of the leak repair material used by the underground depth. As a result, it was possible to know the required thickness of the leak repair material according to the depth of the structure to be built underground.

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In Korea, no institutional tool or regulation exists by which a retail business in charge of gathering and maintaining subscribers can be guaranteed independence from the wholesale business division of a fixed incumbent provider of essential facilities such as ducts, poles and copper or fiber cables, which may also be offering the same products to its rivals. For that reason, a wholesale division may have an incentive to intentionally disrupt the sharing of facilities requested by competitive operators in cooperation with the retail division. Ultimately, the facility sharing process will remain inactive when there is a lack of equivalent access to the fixed access network. Therefore, this paper analyzes recent cases of access network separation and suggests long-term measures for the successful implementation of the sharing of facilities.