This study draws upon communicative processes in policy transfer to consider the ways in which policy may be adapted to context or distorted. The theoretical framework is used to investigate exactly what the South Korean government borrowed from UK social enterprise policy. Despite claims that the UK was the source of both the general policy direction and the particular regulatory device, the Korean government did not learn about the specific contexts of the British policy, nor attempt two-way communication with domestic stakeholders. Rather, the UK policy was interpreted in accordance with the Korean government's own ideas about how to utilize social enterprise. Historical legacies of top-down decision making played an important role in this process, as did the state's role as a regulator which mobilizes the private sector to achieve policy goals. The consequences have been negative for those organizations refused social enterprise status under the Ministry of Labor's strict approval system, as well as for the original target population: the socially disadvantaged and vulnerable. It is suggested that the model advanced may help to illuminate the reasons why some borrowed policies differ considerably from the originals, and the use of policy transfer as a means of legitimization.

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This study aims to provide a new three-way typology of policy legitimacy (i.e., substantive legitimacy, procedural legitimacy, and feasibility-centered legitimacy), while taking into account the relationship between politics (elected officials) and administration (unelected officials) as one of the most significant but under-discussed issues in the studies of policy legitimacy. This analytical framework is used to investigate the empirical case of South Korea's cultural policy. The sequential causal relations between the three types of legitimacy and policy outcomes are then discussed. The case analysis demonstrates that the substantive and procedural legitimacy achieved in the earlier stages of the policy process were not enough to guarantee a successful policy outcome, and hence, feasibility-centered legitimacy was needed as a necessary condition for policy success. If there is a lack of consistency among the three types of legitimacy and coordination issues between elected and unelected officials in the legitimization process, seemingly legitimate policies could have unsuccessful outcomes. This study will contribute to the theoretical advancement of policy legitimacy and to the empirical examination of the legitimization process in recently democratized countries like Korea.

This article aims to present a comprehensive analysis of social policy reform, encompassing its two dimensions, that is, reform decision-making and implementation, with reference to Korea's new social assistance programme. In the social policy reform after the economic crisis of 1997, less was delivered locally than decided centrally. First, there were decision deficits centrally, which became visible locally. This was considerably attributable to the fact that the decision-making process after 'framework legislation' was passed showed more active involvement of conservative forces 'from above' -despite the new-found importance of pro-welfare forces 'from below'. Second, there were implementation deficits locally. This article explains the reasons why legislated policy was not implemented as designed in the light of three barriers to implementation. Although a powerful government may be able to steer reform through central decision making, it is not necessarily in control of effective implementation at the local level. Points for practitionersToday's decision making in a lately democratized country such as Korea reflects the increase of power resources available to societal groups, but state officials play a more pivotal role, especially during the enforcement preparation process (the second round of decision making). Attention needs to be paid to the interplays between them, which may be particular to time and place. Changes in policy goals and contents at the central decision-making level do not always result in intended changes in implementation. The analysis of decision making should thus be followed by an investigation of implementation, which is rarely performed in the international literature on welfare reform.

A shift in policy goals at the central decision‐making level does not always produce the expected degree of change in policy implementation. This article investigates what actually happens at the local level in respect of the implementation of the reformed Employment Insurance Programme of Korea through case studies covering three district governments. Given the sources of difficulty in implementation, local case studies show that the change that welfare reform sought has not fully materialised in reform implementation. Therefore, successfully pursuing welfare reform must involve the necessary change in the implementation process that follows reform decision‐making.