Fusarium wilt of banana (FWB) is a serious soil-borne fungal disease. In the previous century, FWB already destroyed Gros Michel-based banana cultures in Central America, and currently, the disease threatens all major banana-producing regions of the world. The causal agents of these epidemics, however, are diverse. Gros Michel was infected by a wide range of Fusarium species, the so-called Race 1 strains, whereas the contemporary Cavendish-based cultures are affected by Fusarium odoratissimum, colloquially called Tropical Race 4 (TR4). TR4 was reported in Mozambique on two commercial banana farms in 2013, but no incursions were found outside the farm boundaries in 2015, suggesting that the disease was under control. Here we report the presence of TR4 outside of these farm boundaries. We obtained fungal samples from 13 banana plants in smallholder and roadside plantings at various locations throughout northern Mozambique. These samples tested positive for TR4 by molecular diagnostics and in greenhouse pathogenicity assays. The results were confirmed with re-isolations, thereby completing Koch’s postulate. To study the diversity of TR4 isolates in Mozambique, we selected five samples for whole-genome sequencing. Comparison with a global collection of TR4 samples revealed very little genetic variation, indicating that the fungus is clonally spreading in Mozambique. Furthermore, isolates from Mozambique are clearly genetically separated from other geographic incursions, and thus we cannot trace the origin of TR4 in Mozambique. Nevertheless, our data demonstrate the dissemination of TR4 in Mozambique, underscoring the failure of disease management strategies. This threatens African banana production.

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Over the last two decades, there has been a trend amongst EU Member States to set up specialized market authorities with rather strictly defined competences. Recently, it seems that a different approach is favoured: EU Member States set up new authorities with broader scopes of competence or even combine existing authorities into super-authorities, thereby concentrating both power and responsibility. The Netherlands is an example where the legislator has chosen to combine three administrative bodies into one super-authority by 1 January 2013. This new entity, the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM), is described by its Chairman-to-be, Chris Fonteijn, as a body that applies a problem-based approach. That being so, the questions remain as to exactly how the ACM will carry out this new approach and how it will use its competences in doing so. This article places the ACM within the general European trend of merging authorities and expanding power. It aims to answer the question whether the ACM has been given the right structure and the necessary powers to live up to the legislator's expectations. In the first place, we give an overview of the trend towards more concentrated market authorities in Europe. Secondly, we explain the structural changes which the ACM will undergo and identify its key elements. Thirdly, we evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the new super-authority and explain their practical implications. We conclude with some remarks about what other countries can learn from the Dutch example.