The following contribution contemplates so-called 'octroyed', 'conceded' or 'granted' constitutions of 19 th century Europe whose common roots are to be found in the French Charte constitutionnelle of 1814. Strongly influenced by the spirit of Restoration and based on the monarchical principle, as reaffirmed by the Congress of Vienna (1814Vienna ( -1815 and the founding act of the German Confederation (1820) 1 , these Charters stem from a paternalistic process of domestic constitution-making without any direct involvement of (a body representing) the people.The terminology employed in legal literature to examine the phenomenon is not entirely fixed. Although English speaking scholars refer predominantly to 'conceded' or 'granted' constitutions, it appears to be more adequate to speak of 'octroyed' constitutions. The term 'octroyed' is commonly used in its different linguistic expressions in those countries which experienced significant periods of octroyed constitutions: in German, oktroyierte Verfassung, in French, constitution octroyée, in Italian, costituzione ottriata and, in Portuguese, constituição outorgada.The French Charter of 1814, the archetype of all octroyed constitutions, contains the following royal statement at the very end of its preamble: 'Nous avons volontairement et par le libre exercice de notre autorité royale accordé, et accordons, fait concession et octroi à nos sujets, tant pour nous que pour nos successeurs et à toujours, de la charte constitutionnelle qui suit'. 2 Clearly the three terms are used together in that occasion. Hence, from a linguistic, as well as from a legal-historical perspective, the adjectives 'granted' and 'conceded' might be used as synonyms of 'octroyed'. But as we are dealing here with a matter of constitutional law and theory where language matters and as we are striving to develop convincing elements of a theory of octroi in constitution making, this contribution will therefore promote the corresponding vocabulary, even though the above quoted final sentence of the preamble of the

EU member state status - Member statehood - The idea of an “Integrated State” - Impact of EU membership on the concepts and substance of national constitutional law - Europeanization of member state's constitutional law - European constitutional law understood as Europeanized national constitutional law - European functions of constitutional organs - How to protect fundamental rights in a European area characterized by the overlaying of legal sources - The concept of “higher law” within the national legal order - A Union of Constitutionally Integrated States

As it is obviously impossible for the modern ‘demos’ to assemble in order to take political decisions, democratic representation is an inevitable tool in large democracies. Representatives have to stand for and to act for the people as a whole. Accordingly, the principle of representative or parliamentary democracy is a fundamental constitutional principle shared by all the Member States of the Union. Democracy doubtlessly works on the national level; the Member States' decisional powers, however, are fading with the constant transfer of competences towards the European level. This leads to a system of European ‘multi-level governance’ with wide consequences for the linkage between the represented peoples of the Member States and their representatives on both national and European levels.

In the history of constitutional changes in Europe, the making of a new constitution is often linked to violent incidents like a revolution, a coup d'état or a war. That is why the change of the constitution was mostly preceded by a change of the holder of the constituent power. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, however, is currently engaged in a process of constitution making in compliance with the revision procedure established by the existent document. The Constitution of the Grand Duchy, one of the oldest constitutional documents in Europe still in force, is undergoing a far-reaching revision aiming at a general overhaul.1 According to the parliamentary committee in charge, this revision shall finally give birth to a 'new' constitution, meaning that a modified and updated edition of the constitution shall be published in the national official journal (Mémorial). The revised text will then be considered as the Constitution of 2013 or, more likely, of 2014. The Constitution of 1868 is to be repealed. After the previous charters from 1841, 1848 and 1856 and the present text from 1868, it would thus become the fifth constitution of the Grand Duchy. As constitutional history also shows, this would not be the first time that Luxembourg adopts a new constitution following the formal amendment procedure foreseen by the previous document.2 Local politicians and lawyers seem to consider that the academic distinction between 'constitution making' by the will of an original pouvoir constituant and 'constitutional revision' through a parliamentary procedure prescribed by the constitution itself represents rather a gradual difference than a fundamental one. A number of good reasons convinced the Committee on Institutions and Constitutional Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies to introduce on 21 April 2009 a revision proposal aiming to modify and re-arrange the out-dated Constitution of 1868. While several initiatives for a general revision of the Constitution have been undertaken since the 1970s, none has been successful. Only fractional revisions were adopted in a century and a half. Between 1919 and 2009, no less than thirty-four amendments are listed, the last dating from 12 March 2009. Having occurred at different times and on various aspects, they have certainly undermined the coherence of the initial text. Nonetheless, the Constitution still includes a majority of provisions dating back to its origins. The main reasons put forward by the drafters of the revision proposal are: first, to modernize a terminology somewhat out-dated; second, to adapt the legal text to the political reality by re-writing the constitution and make it coincide with the 'living constitution' as reflected in the functioning of institutions, and third, to incorporate into the written constitution provisions relating to succession to the throne currently contained in a legal document of uncertain value, namely the Family Compact of the House of Nassau (Nassauischer Erbfolgeverein) of 1783. Almost four years after its launch, this amendment procedure, still far from being accomplished, is now, in February 2013, in a sufficiently advanced stage to allow some general commentaries. Given the limited format of this country report, the following remarks will focus on a brief presentation of the applicable revision procedure and a provisional scrutiny of some of the most substantial amendments under discussion.

In March 2020, during the first wave of the COVID-19 (Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2) pandemic in Europe, several Member States, including the Federal Republic of Germany, saw fit to resort to the reintroduction of border controls with some of their neighbours, including the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. This reintroduction was then justified by the urgency and the need to contain the spread of the virus. So that there is no misunderstanding: these were exclusively identity checks and checks on documents authorizing their holders to cross borders and not health checks to detect carriers of the virus. This contribution aims to establish, using the example of the German-Luxemburg border controls, that the use of this extraordinary means does not stand the test of its effectiveness, proportionality and even less of its legality. To the extent that the perpetrator was himself a victim of this extraordinary measure, he may be forgiven for the somewhat militant character of the following lines. The German Minister of the Interior, Mr Horst Seehofer, who took this decision on behalf of Germany, may have invoked the European Union (EU) Border Code as the legal basis for his decision to reintroduce internal border controls in the Schengen area, but it must be questioned whether he has complied with the letter and spirit of this regulation. An in-depth analysis of the provisions of this Borders Code (I.) shows indeed that the unilateral decision taken by Minister Seehofer was taken arbitrarily (II.) and does not stand the test of its validity under Union law (III.)