See Art. 9 of EMIR. Other jurisdictions have introduced similar provisions, including the US (via Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act). According to the Financial Stability Board (FSB), as of June 2016, 19 out of 24 FSB jurisdictions had in force trade reporting requirements, covering more than 90% of OTC derivative transactions (FSB, 2016). Section 1 Introduction ESRB Occasional Paper Series No 11/ September 2016 Counterparty (CP) data Reporting timestamp Counterparty ID, name, etc -both for the reporting entity, and for the counterparty of the reporting entity Corporate sector of the CP ID of broker, beneficiary, etc. Counterparty side (buyer/seller) 3Comparison of the aggregates obtained from the BIS semi-annual survey with those from the BIS triennial survey, which covers many more institutions (around 400) from many more countries (47), suggests that the market share of semi-annual reporters is about 97% for interest rate and credit derivatives. Still, neither survey covers positions between two nonreporting entities. By contrast, EMIR covers all EU-resident entities.

This paper provides a unique snapshot of the exposures of EU banks to shadow banking entities within the global financial system. Drawing on a rich and novel dataset, the paper documents the cross-sector and cross-border linkages and considers which are the most relevant for systemic risk monitoring. From a macroprudential perspective, the identification of potential feedback and contagion channels arising from the linkages of banks and shadow banking entities is particularly challenging when shadow banking entities are domiciled in different jurisdictions. The analysis shows that many of the EU banks' exposures are towards non-EU entities, particularly USdomiciled shadow banking entities. At the individual level, banks' exposures are diversified although this diversification leads to high overlap across different types of shadow banking entities.

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This paper provides a unique snapshot of the exposures of EU banks to shadow banking entities within the global financial system. Drawing on a rich and novel dataset, the paper documents the cross-sector and cross-border linkages and considers which are the most relevant for systemic risk monitoring. From a macroprudential perspective, the identification of potential feedback and contagion channels arising from the linkages of banks and shadow banking entities is particularly challenging when shadow banking entities are domiciled in different jurisdictions. The analysis shows that many of the EU banks' exposures are towards non-EU entities, particularly USdomiciled shadow banking entities. At the individual level, banks' exposures are diversified although this diversification leads to high overlap across different types of shadow banking entities.